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Discussing cables
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VZCZCXRO2470
OO RUEHDBU RUEHFL RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHROV RUEHSR
DE RUEHSI #1100/01 1311228
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 111228Z MAY 07
FM AMEMBASSY TBILISI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 6302
INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 TBILISI 001100
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
DEPT FOR EUR DAS BRYZA AND EUR/CARC
E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/10/2017
TAGS: PREL PGOV GG
SUBJECT: INTERIOR MINISTER MERABISHVILI'S VIEWS ON THE
CONFLICTS
Classified By: Ambassador John F. Tefft for reasons 1.4(b)&(d).
Summary
-------
¶1. (C) In a wide-ranging discussion of the separatist
conflicts with the Ambassador May 9, Georgian Minister of
Internal Affairs Vano Merabishvili said Abkhaz de facto
president Sergei Bagapsh has the mentality of a typical
Soviet administrator, hopelessly afraid of making any
decisions that entail risk or that might upset Moscow. While
Merabishvili declined to say whether Georgia would consider
any overtures to the Abkhaz -- saying such political
decisions are the province of President Saakashvili -- it is
clear from Merabishvili's analysis that he doubts such
initiatives will have any effect. He said he does not know
why the Abkhaz suddenly decided to release three Georgian
students May 3, and expressed even more bewilderment over
what the Russians had hoped to gain by the March 11
helicopter attack on the Kodori Gorge. On South Ossetia,
Merabishvili said the pro-Georgian "alternative president"
Dmitry Sanakoyev is steadily gaining popular support, and the
Georgian government is working on a number of development
projects in the Sanakoyev-controlled area. End Summary.
Back to the Brezhnev Era in Abkhazia
------------------------------------
¶2. (C) Merabishvili told Ambassador and DCM that he does not
expect Bagapsh to order a "provocation" to heighten tensions,
adding that it is clear that Bagapsh and most if not all of
his Abkhaz associates have no information on the Kodori
attack. Merabishvili noted that Abkhaz "defense minister"
Sultan Soslaniyev had resigned May 8, and said this
underlines the dominant role of Anatoly Zaitsev, a Russian
who serves as the Abkhaz military's "chief of staff."
Merabishvili said Bagapsh is in full political control of
Abkhazia -- dismissing rumors that de facto vice-president
Khajimba may be able to constrain his actions -- but the
problem is Bagapsh's personality. Merabishvili described
Bagapsh as having the mindset of a typical Brezhnev-era
administrator, as well as a history of Soviet-style
corruption in the energy business that also gives the
Russians leverage over him. Because of this, Merabishvili
said, Bagapsh is unwilling to make unpopular decisions, to
"break traditions," or to go against strong personalities
like Zaitsev.
¶3. (C) Asked by Ambassador and DCM what he thought of
offering economic carrots to the Abkhaz, Merabishvili said
this might be a good idea in ten to fifteen years, but given
the current situation in Abkhazia it would produce no
response -- and in fact might be harmful if it undercut the
growing sense among the Abkhaz that they are being left
behind as Georgia advances economically. Merabishvili said
that while Bagapsh puts on a better appearance in meetings
with Western diplomats than his South Ossetian counterpart
Kokoity, he is actually less willing to undertake actions on
his own initiative; in classic Soviet style, Bagapsh talks at
length but says nothing, carefully weighing his comments for
the hidden tape recorder in the room. Merabishvili said
Bagapsh is in fact fairly disengaged from his work, drinking
daily (the cause of his recent health problem) and leaving
many issues to de facto prime minister Ankvab. Given all
this, Merabishvili said, Bagapsh is unwilling to meet with
Saakashvili or to negotiate seriously with the Georgians, and
would only do so if the Russians ordered it.
¶4. (C) Merabishvili said he had not expected the Abkhaz to
release the students arrested along the Enguri River in March
when they did, even though the Georgians had been in contact
with the Abkhaz through an intermediary from the Georgian
region of Adjara. He said his ministry had informed the
Abkhaz that it could not control the actions of people in the
Gali district if the students were not released, but he had
not expected this to produce a quick response. He speculated
that Bagapsh may have sped up the release to get the issue
out of the way before a visit from French diplomats.
Russians at Sea
---------------
¶5. (C) Merabishvili said it is clear the Russians do not know
what to do in Abkhazia, or in their relations with Georgia
generally. He said Viktor Komogorov, a deputy head of the
Russian FSB, had admitted to one of Merabishvili's deputies
that the economic blockade had not hurt Georgia as much as
the Russians expected. Merabishvili said it was lucky that
Georgia is experiencing such high economic growth, which
blunts the blow of the Russian sanctions. He said Komogorov
had said that Russia would never recognize the independence
of Abkhazia and South Ossetia -- "the current situation is
the best for us -- we need all of Georgia" -- and he claimed
TBILISI 00001100 002 OF 002
to believe that Georgia would need only about six months of
preparation to move from its Euroatlantic-oriented foreign
policy to a Russian orientation. Merabishvili said it was
clear that Komogorov, whom he called the source of most ideas
about Russia's Georgia policy, did not understand
the real
situation in Georgia. Merabishvili added that the Kodori
attack was the least comprehensible decision he had ever
encountered in his life. He speculated that many Russian
officials -- perhaps even Putin himself, he said with a laugh
-- have no idea who in the Russian government had decided to
launch the attack or why. He said the Russians are
continuing their espionage activities in Georgia as before.
Progress in South Ossetia
-------------------------
¶6. (C) Turning to South Ossetia, Merabishvili said
Sanakoyev's popularity in the region increases every day;
people no longer talk about whether he is a Georgian agent,
but instead about whether he is good or bad. He said
Sanakoyev's team of ethnic Ossetians have excellent contacts
in Tskhinvali, and through them the Georgians know about
every important conversation in Tskhinvali soon after it
happens -- something that has reduced the risk of "accidents"
and "provocations." He said the Georgian government is
buying land to build houses for Sanakoyev officials in Kurta
-- driving the price of land there higher than in exclusive
parts of Tbilisi -- and also plans to build a hotel and
restaurant in Kurta and a disco in Tamarasheni. Merabishvili
said that as Sanakoyev has come closer to becoming a
legitimate official, his security situation has improved
greatly; the Georgians now have no information about active
plans to harm him, while six months ago five different groups
were gathering information on how to kill him.
¶7. (C) Commenting on the recent discovery of a shoulder-fired
anti-aircraft missile in South Ossetia, Merabishvili said he
understood that the de facto authorities have five such
missiles left from a group of eight brought into the region
two years ago. He said that to prevent defections, the
Russians had recently increased salaries of police officers
and other officials in Tskhinvali, so that they now earn more
than their counterparts in Georgian-controlled areas or in
Vladikavkaz. Merabishvili encouraged the Embassy to consider
holding concerts and other cultural events in Kurta or along
the dividing line in Tamarasheni, so that people from the
Georgian enclave could easily attend.
Comment
-------
¶8. (C) Unfortunately, Merabishvili's pessimistic evaluation
of Bagapsh may contain some truth. While we often hear
rumors that Bagapsh has new ideas and is interested in
talking with the West, every time we travel to Abkhazia to
meet him he offers nothing of substance. Recently the Abkhaz
have pulled out of two planned U.S.-sponsored study tours: a
joint NATO tour with the Georgians (which a number of de
facto officials were eager to join) and a humanitarian
medical trip to Ukraine, organized by John Snow
International, to learn techniques for care of newborns in
hospitals. Even South Ossetian doctors were able to
participate in the latter program. Both decisions suggest a
regime fundamentally afraid to take chances.
¶9. (C) Clearly Merabishvili is a major player in Georgian
policy toward both conflicts. He acknowledged that
"pressing" the Abkhaz is a major part of Georgia's strategy,
and we have no reason to doubt that President Saakashvili
fully agrees. At the same time, however, Merabishvili was
unwilling to totally rule out new overtures to the Abkhaz,
even though the logic of his argument suggests they would be
useless. For all Merabishvili's influence, his realm appears
to stop here, with Saakashvili personally handling matters of
diplomatic strategy.
TEFFT
Wikileaks: Georgia 