Monthly Archives: July 2008

08TBILISI1296, OSCE-JPKF JOINT PATROL COMES UNDER FIRE TRYING TO

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
08TBILISI1296 2008-07-30 12:42 2011-08-30 01:44 CONFIDENTIAL Embassy Tbilisi

VZCZCXRO9407
PP RUEHFL RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHROV RUEHSR
DE RUEHSI #1296 2121242
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 301242Z JUL 08
FM AMEMBASSY TBILISI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 9820
INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHVEN/USMISSION USOSCE PRIORITY 2182

C O N F I D E N T I A L TBILISI 001296 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT. FOR EUR/CARC 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/31/2018 
TAGS: PREL PGOV GG
SUBJECT: OSCE-JPKF JOINT PATROL COMES UNDER FIRE TRYING TO 
INVESTIGATE SHOOTING INCIDENT 
 
REF: TBILISI 1170 
 
Classified By: Ambassador John F. Tefft, for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d) 
 
1. (C) Summary and comment: Two OSCE-Joint Peacekeeping 
Forces (JPKF) monitoring patrols were denied access to two 
separate incident sites in the breakaway region of South 
Ossetia on July 28 and 29, with one patrol coming under 
direct fire.  A firefight erupted near the village of 
Cholibauri, approximately 7 km southwest of Tskhinvali on the 
evening of July 28.  No injuries were reported; however, when 
a joint OSCE-JPKF monitoring patrol arrived to investigate, 
the patrol was turned away by armed South Ossetian militia. 
The patrol returned a second time and were again forced to 
withdraw by the South Ossetian militia, who fired warning 
shots in the air.  A separate joint patrol was traveling to 
investigate a firefight that took place in the early morning 
of July 29 near the villages of Andzisi and Sveri when it 
came under fire by unknown assailants.  OSCE monitors 
reported that the patrol was targeted by small arms and 
under-barrel grenade fire, but no one was injured.  A second 
patrol later returned and was granted access to the site 
without further incident. There were also separate incidents 
of firefights breaking out near the villages of Eredvi and 
Sarabuki, though no casualties were reported.  Tension 
remains high in South Ossetia, where nightly shooting 
incidents have become the norm.  OSCE assesses that relations 
between the three sides of the JPKF (Georgia, Russia and 
Ossetia) remain fractured over suspicions that the Georgian 
JPKF knew in advance of the July 3 shelling of Tskhinvali 
(reftel).  There have also been rumors that JPKF Commander 
General Kulakmetov and the de-facto authorities are at odds 
with one another, which may explain the behavior of the South 
Ossetian militia near Cholibauri.  End summary and comment. 
 
Joint patrols denied access to incident sites 
--------------------------------------------- 
2. (C) On the evening of July 28, a firefight broke out near 
the village of Cholibauri, approximately 7 km southwest of 
Tskhinvali.  No injuries were reported; however, a joint 
OSCE-JPKF patrol was twice denied access to the incident site 
by armed South Ossetian militia, who fired warning shots in 
the air when the patrol returned a second time.  OSCE 
reported that they have issued a freedom of movement 
violation to the South Ossetian de-facto authorities for 
restricting the right of OSCE-JPKF patrols to move freely 
within the zone of conflict.  OSCE's senior military observer 
speculated that the South Ossetians had probably deployed 
armored vehicles and/or ZU-23 anti-aircraft guns to the area, 
in violation of the cease-fire agreement, and did not want 
the patrol to discover them. 
 
3. (C) More seriously, a joint OSCE-JPKF patrol came under 
small arms and grenade fire as it was traveling to 
investigate a separate shooting incident near the villages of 
Andzisi and Sveri, about 13 km north-northeast of Tskhinvali. 
 OSCE reported that a firefight took place between 12-4 am 
the morning of July 29, where there are opposing South 
Ossetian and Georgian police posts entrenched in the hills. 
A joint OSCE-JPKF monitoring patrol went to investigate, when 
they came under fire by unknown assailants.  No injuries were 
reported.  A second joint patrol returned later on July 29 
and was granted access to the site without further incident. 
When questioned by the JPKF, both the Georgians and South 
Ossetian admitted to "returning fire" during the firefight, 
but not to starting it, and both denied firing on the earlier 
joint patrol. 
 
 
TEFFT

Wikileaks

08TBILISI1286, LABOR PARTY ACTIVIST ARRESTED, NATELASHVILI CLAIMS

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
08TBILISI1286 2008-07-29 11:43 2011-08-30 01:44 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Tbilisi

VZCZCXRO8512
PP RUEHAG RUEHAST RUEHDA RUEHDF RUEHFL RUEHIK RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHLN
RUEHLZ RUEHPOD RUEHROV RUEHSR RUEHVK RUEHYG
DE RUEHSI #1286 2111143
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 291143Z JUL 08
FM AMEMBASSY TBILISI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 9815
INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE

UNCLAS TBILISI 001286 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR EUR/CARC 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PREL PGOV PHUM KDEM GG
SUBJECT: LABOR PARTY ACTIVIST ARRESTED, NATELASHVILI CLAIMS 
POLITICAL PERSECUTION 
 
REF: TBILISI 1273 
 
1. (U) On July 25, Georgian police arrested Labor Party 
activist Archil Benidze on charges of money laundering. 
Chairman of the Labor Party Shalva Natelashvili held a press 
brief where he denounced the arrest as "political persecution 
by the government."  Natelashvili alleged the arrest was 
engineered to obtain "false evidence" against him to be used 
in arresting him as well.  News reports claimed the 
Prosecutor General's office  (PGO) has taped conversations 
between Natelashvili and an associate of deceased oligarch 
Badri Patarkatsishvili, regarding money transfers to Georgia. 
 Benidze was on the party list, and was Labor's majoritarian 
candidate in the Aspindza district of the Samstkhe-Javakheti 
region, during the May parliamentary elections.  He is not a 
well-known public figure. 
 
2. (SBU) Deputy Foreign Minister Giga Bokeria informed the 
Ambassador of the arrest in advance.  Anticipating 
Natelashvili's charge of political persecution, Bokeria said 
there was ample evidence of money laundering.  The Embassy 
also inquired about the charges with the PGO, which provided 
Post the following explanation.  Begin Text: 
 
On 30 November 2007 the criminal investigation was initiated 
by the Investigation Unit of Constitutional Security 
Department of the Ministry of Internal Affairs (MOIA) of 
Georgia Under Article 194 Section 2 (a, b) of the Criminal 
Code of Georgia (money laundering). 
 
On 26 July 2008, Mr. Archil Benidze (member of Labour Party 
of Georgia) was charged with Article 194 Section 2 (a, c) of 
the Criminal Code of Georgia (Edition in force as for 12 
April 2008) and on the same day Tbilisi City Court issued an 
Order for the application of pre-trial detention as a measure 
of constraint against Mr. Benidze.  The case is still under 
an investigation. 
 
End text. 
 
3. (SBU) Comment: Natelashvili has submitted letters (emailed 
to EUR/CARC) to the Embassy requesting political asylum and 
alleging persecution by the government.  Natelashvili has 
also alleged the government is pressuring him with threat of 
arrest to enter Parliament, ostensibly to "legitimize" the 
body.  Natelashvili has recently held several press briefings 
before the MOIA and PGO, where he has denounced the two 
offices and claimed he would not allow his party members to 
testify on pending investigations (such as Benidze's). 
Benidze's arrest comes at the same time as a New Rightist 
activist was charged with attempted bribery, and Eka 
Beselia's son awaits trial (reftel).  End comment. 
TEFFT

Wikileaks

08TBILISI1273, EKA BESELIA CLAIMS SON’S ARREST IS POLITICALLY

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
08TBILISI1273 2008-07-25 07:30 2011-08-30 01:44 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Tbilisi

VZCZCXRO5964
PP RUEHAG RUEHAST RUEHDA RUEHDF RUEHFL RUEHIK RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHLN
RUEHLZ RUEHPOD RUEHROV RUEHSR RUEHVK RUEHYG
DE RUEHSI #1273 2070730
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 250730Z JUL 08
FM AMEMBASSY TBILISI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 9806
INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE

UNCLAS TBILISI 001273 
 
SIPDIS 
SENSITIVE 
 
DEPT FOR EUR/CARC 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PREL PGOV PHUM KDEM GG
SUBJECT: EKA BESELIA CLAIMS SON'S ARREST IS POLITICALLY 
MOTIVATED 
 
REF: TBILISI 925 
 
1. (SBU) Summary:  Eka Beselia, member of the Joint 
Opposition, activist and well-known defense lawyer, alleged 
her son's recent arrest is politically motivated and is the 
latest step by the GOG to repress members of the opposition. 
Beselia's son, Rati Milorava (age 15 or 16) is facing two to 
five years imprisonment for the crime of "hooliganism," a 
crime in which Beselia says her son was only a witness. 
Poloffs met with Beselia at her request and subsequently 
discussed the case with the Prosecutor General's Office 
numerous times.  We are unable at this point to discern the 
truth because the story varies between each side.   No court 
date has been set and Milorava is currently out of jail after 
posting bail of 2000 GEL (about 1,408 USD).  End Summary. 
 
2. (SBU) In a June 28 meeting, Beselia told Poloff that her 
15-year old son, Rati Milorava, was issued a summons to 
appear before the Prosecutor's Office on June 30 as a witness 
to an incident which occurred four months ago.  Beselia said 
that an insider at the Prosecutor's office, whom she refused 
to identify, confided to her that her son would be arrested 
for "hooliganism" when he appeared and his arrest was 
retribution for her political activism.  Kakha Kukava, of the 
Joint Opposition also attended, and said that he had 
contacted the OSCE and NDI to ask for their help.  Kukava 
asserted that Milorava's arrest was the latest step of the 
GOG to repress members of the opposition for their activism, 
and that it was spreading now to affect their families.  On 
July 1 Milorava was arrested, and on July 2 the Tbilisi City 
court heard the case.  The Prosecutor General's Office gave 
Post a copy of the police report and the series of events are 
inconsistent with Beselia's and Kukava's story. 
 
3. (SBU) Poloffs met with Beselia on 16 July and were 
presented with evidence suggesting the Prosecutor's Office 
altered Milorava's participation in the events only after 
Beselia threatened to revoke her participation in the 21 May 
parliamentary election.  According to Beselia, Milorava was 
considered a witness in an altercation between a friend and a 
security guard after another friend attempted to steal candy, 
but the charges were allegedly trumped up to include Milorava 
in "hooliganism" (which carries a maximum penalty of 2-5 
years in prison) immediately preceding the parliamentary 
elections as a tool to stop Beselia's participation.  Beselia 
acknowledged her son was present during the incident but told 
Poloffs that she will not halt her political activism because 
her son is innocent.  She said she will fight to remove these 
charges.  In addition, Beselia claims she has filed for her 
son's political asylum with the French Embassy. 
 
4. (SBU) Poloffs subsequently discussed Beselia's accusations 
several times with the Prosecutor General's Office, most 
recently on July 22, but were unable to determine precisely 
why Milorava's charges were altered.  According to the 
Prosecutor General's Office, the  MOIA is still investigating 
the case, and a trial date is still pending. 
 
5. (SBU) Comments: The truth likely lies somewhere between 
the two sides' stories.  It appears that Milorava was present 
and involved in an altercation.  However, the Prosecutor's 
Office has not charged the youth who instigated the 
confrontation by stealing candy and says it has no plans to 
do so due to the resources required to prosecute the theft of 
such an insignificant sum (1 USD).  End Comment. 
 
TEFFT

Wikileaks

08TBILISI1268, SUMMARY OF RUSSIAN MILITARY ACTIVITIES IN

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
08TBILISI1268 2008-07-25 04:36 2011-08-30 01:44 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Tbilisi

VZCZCXRO5838
PP RUEHAG RUEHAST RUEHDA RUEHDF RUEHFL RUEHIK RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHLN
RUEHLZ RUEHPOD RUEHROV RUEHSR RUEHVK RUEHYG
DE RUEHSI #1268/01 2070436
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 250436Z JUL 08
FM AMEMBASSY TBILISI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 9802
INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 TBILISI 001268 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR EUR/CARC 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PREL PGOV PHUM KDEM GG
SUBJECT: SUMMARY OF RUSSIAN MILITARY ACTIVITIES IN 
ABKHAZIA: APRIL - JULY 2008 
 
1. (SBU) Summary:  The Ambassador attended a July 22 meeting 
at the MFA for NATO Ambassadors.  A paper prepared by the 
Ministry of Internal Affairs was distributed, summarizing 
Russian military activities in Abkhazia this spring.  The 
paper is not classified, but the MFA asked that it be treated 
as sensitive because of some of the sources of information. 
End summary. 
 
Begin Text 
 
2. (SBU) Putin's Decree: 
-- On March 6, 2008, Russia withdrew from the 1996 CIS 
agreement prohibiting governments inter alia from military 
relations with Abkhazia. 
-- On April 16, 2008, Russian President Vladimer Putin issued 
a decree urging the federal government to establish direct 
relations with the de facto authorities of Abkhazia and South 
Ossetia 
 
3. (SBU) Increased Number of Peacekeepers: 
-- Before April 29, 2008, the number of Russian peacekeepers 
deployed in Abkhazia amounted to roughly 2000 soldiers. 
-- The Russian government claims that by May 4, 2008 the 
number of their troops in Abkhazia increased up to 2500, but 
according to our information their real numbers exceeds 
official data. 
-- On April 29, 2008, the Russian peacekeeping contingent 
deployed in the Georgian-Abkhaz conflict zone increased 
greatly: 
-- An echelon of 30-32 wagons crossed the Georgian-Russian 
Border near the river Psou by railway carrying 26 units of 
camouflaged armor vehicles, among them: BMD vehicles, D-30 
type howitzers etc. 
-- The echelon had 4 additional passenger cars, carrying 
soldiers from Novorosiisk military base. 
-- The military vehicles were unloaded in Ochamchire.  One 
part of the soldiers and armament was sent to Tkvarcheli 
district and another part to Gali district. 
 
4. (SBU) Deployment of Airborne Troops: 
-- The PKF units recently deployed in Abkhazia also include a 
joint battalion (545 soldiers) of the Novorossiysk and Pskov 
Airborne Division, thus violating the 1994 agreement. 
-- They are stationed in village Okhurei of Tkvarcheli 
district and Reka of Ochamchire district and are patrolling 
at checkpoints no. 402 and no. 403 (near villages Arasadzisi 
and Akamara).  This fact was further confirmed by Russian 
official newspaper "Krasnaya Zvezda" on July 9, 2008. 
 
5. (SBU) Deployment of MOD GRU Unit 
-- Approximately 250 Chechen members of Vostok and Zapad 
battalions of the Main Intelligence Unit of the Russian 
Defense Ministry have been deployed in Abkhazia. 
-- Currently they are patrolling in Gali district (Gudava and 
Primorsk villages) and at checkpoints no. 208 (Meore Otobaia 
village) and no. 109 (Sida village) 
 
6. (SBU) Russian Deployment in Abkhazia 
-- In April-June, according to our information Russia has 
additionally deployed in Abkhazia approximately: BUK air 
defense system, 50 aviation specialists, 30 military experts, 
100 communication and antiaircraft defense experts, 40 D-30 
type howitzers, 10 BM-21 "Grad" systems, 20 Shilka 
ZU-23-2/ZU-23-4 AA guns, 120 anti-tank missles and 2 MI-24 
helicopters. 
 
7. (SBU) Building New Check-Points: 
-- On May 1, 2008, new illegal checkpoints were opened on 
almost every strategically important road in Ochamchire and 
Tkvarcheli districts, among them at Nakarghali, Arasatsisi 
and Akamara. 
-- In violation of the 1994 agreement, the Russian side does 
not allow Georgian and international observers to monitor 
their locations, including the Bombora military base in 
Gudauta. 
-- Russia is currently operating checkpoints at the following 
sites: Nakargali, Otobaia, Nabakevi, Pichori, Chuburkhinji, 
Dikhazurga, Saberio, Lekukhona, Muzhava, Rechkhi, and Akamara. 
 
8. (SBU) Shooting Down Georgian UAV 
-- On April 20, 2008, at 10:00 AM a Russian fighter plane 
entering from the Russian Federation attacked and shot down a 
Georgian Unmanned Flying Vehicle "Hermes-450" above Gagida 
village in Gali district. 
-- This fact was further confirmed by the UN special 
investigation. 
 
9. (SBU) Railway Troops 
-- On May 31, 2008, the Russian Ministry of Defense deployed 
 
TBILISI 00001268  002 OF 003 
 
 
400 soldiers of Volgograd's 76th Unit of Railway Forces in 
Abkhazia. 
-- These forces are preparing railway platforms for 
transportation of military equipment and construction 
materials from Sokhumi to Ochamchire, even though there is no 
economic activity in Ochamchire today. 
-- Russian authorities accuse Georgia of preparation to war, 
while they themselves prepare infrastructure for military 
purposes. 
 
10. (SBU) Russian Non-Peacekeeping Troops 
-- Currently Russian non-peacekeeping forces are stationed in 
the following places: Ochamchire, Babushera, Bombora, 
Akamara, Sokhumi, Tsebelda, Okhurei, Gagra and Lata. 
 
11. (SBU) Bombora Military Base 
-- At present, Russian military units and equipment are 
stationed along with Abkhaz separatist forces at several 
military bases. 
-- Bombora (Gudauta): By mid-July 2008 several hundred more 
solidiers and 44 military vehicles were observed at the 
Bombora military base, which should have been closed 
according to the Istanbul agreement of 1999. 
-- With Russian assistance, three large barracks are being 
rebuilt at the Bombora military base, waiting for deployment 
of fresh forces. 
-- On June 6, 2008, several "SU-25" and "SU-27" type fighter 
planes (armed) were detected at the Bombora military base in 
Gudauta. 
 
12. (SBU) Ochamchire Military Base 
-- Ochamchire (Seaport): On April 17, 2008, several "Ural" 
trucks carrying 300 Russian contract soldiers entered the 
military base in Ochamchire seaport. 
-- On the same day, one "ZIL-131" military vehicle with 2 
units of antiaircraft system ZU-23 and 15 containers with 
shells, as well as four GAZ-66 vehicles with special 
communication equipment was deployed there. 
-- On May 3, 2008, 5 units of 120mm artillery systems and 
several antiaircraft defense systems BUK-M1 were located at 
the military base in Ochamchire seaport. 
 
13. (SBU) Okhurei Military Base 
-- Okhurei: Approximately two months ago, with the help of 
Russian specialists, the construction of Okhurei military 
base in Tkvarcheli district was finished. 
-- On July 8, 2008, additional Russian soldiers, 4 BTR-70 and 
4 BRDM type military vehicles and several anti-aircraft 
systems were deployed at the base. 
 
14. (SBU) Sokhumi Military Base 
-- At present, the Russians are rebuilding the military base 
in Sokhumi's Maiak (lighthouse) settlement. 
-- On April 30, about 40 train cars entered a railway station 
in Sokhumi loaded with various types of armament, part of the 
cargo was taken to Maiak military base, and another part to 
Tsebelda mountain battalion. 
 
15. (SBU) Antiaircraft Defense 
-- On May 3, 2008, antiaircraft defense systme BUK-M1 were 
deployed in Abkhazia 
 
16. (SBU) Abkhazia Defense Minister's Comment 
-- In his July 7, 2008 interview with Russian information 
agency "Utro", de-facto Minister of Defense Merab Kishmaria 
declared that, "Russian instructors prepare Abkhazian 
soldiers.  I pay them according to contract...We are just 
doing this without publicity". 
 
17. (SBU) Russian Officials in Abkhazia 
-- On April 30, 2008, former head of Russia's peacekeeper's 
staff, Aleksandr Pavliushko was appointed de-facto Deputy 
Minister of Defense by a decree from Abkhazian de-facto 
President. 
-- Since March 2005, Head of General Staff of Abkhazian 
de-facto Ministry of Defense is Anatoly Zaitsev, a 
high-ranking official of the Russian Ministry of Defense. 
 
18. (SBU) Detainment of Illegal Weapons 
-- On June 17, 2008, Georgian police detained a military 
cargo, mainly consisting of 20 anti-tank guided missiles, 
which the Russian peacekeepers were covertly transporting to 
Zugdidi base without any official documents specifying the 
origin or destination of the cargo. 
 
19. (SBU) Military Trainings in North Caucasus 
-- On July 15, 2008, large-scale military trainings 
unprecedented for the last 20 years "Caucasus-2008" started 
in the North Caucasus Military District (NCMD). 
 
TBILISI 00001268  003 OF 003 
 
 
-- Airborne units from Pskov and Novorosiisk are conducting 
operations near the Roki and Mamisoni mountain passes, right 
at the Russian-Georgian border. 
-- 8000 soldiers and 700 armored vehicles from NCMD 
participate in these trainings: airborne units, air force 
units, antiaircraft units, Black Sea and Caspian Sea Fleet, 
Federal Security Service and Internal Troops of the Ministry 
of Internal Affairs. 
 
20. (SBU) Eliminating Armed Grouping 
-- On September 20, 2007, special task units of the MIA of 
Georgia neutralized an armed grouping of 10 people in Kodori 
Gorge, which has planned an attack on the new road connecting 
Upper Abkhazia with the rest of Georgia. 
-- The commander of the grouping and his deputy were killed 
in an exchange of fire. 
-- They were identified as: Igor Muzavatkin - Vice-Colonel of 
Russian armed forces, former member of the Collective 
Peacekeeping Forces, who served on a contract basis in the 
border troops division of the Abkhazian separatist security 
service; and Artur Zorin - Major of Russian armed forces, 
also former member of the Collective Peacekeeping Forces. 
 
21. (SBU) Possible Target - Kodori Gorge 
-- Increase in the number of Russian soldiers, military 
equipment, military trainings and intelligence activity near 
the Kodori Gorge indicates the interest of Russian forces. 
-- The proof for this was an attack on Georgian police 
officers near Achamkhara Mountain who were patrolling the 
gorge on July 9, 2008. 
 
End Text 
TEFFT

Wikileaks

08TBILISI1265, LISTS OF SANCTIONED ENTITIES DELIVERED TO

WikiLeaks Link

To understand the justification used for the classification of each cable, please use this WikiSource article as reference.
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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
08TBILISI1265 2008-07-23 12:21 2011-08-30 01:44 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Tbilisi

VZCZCXRO4153
PP RUEHAG RUEHAST RUEHDA RUEHDF RUEHFL RUEHIK RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHLN
RUEHLZ RUEHPOD RUEHROV RUEHSR RUEHVK RUEHYG
DE RUEHSI #1265 2051221
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 231221Z JUL 08
FM AMEMBASSY TBILISI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 9799
INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE

UNCLAS TBILISI 001265 
 
SIPDIS 
SENSITIVE 
 
DEPT FOR EUR/CARC 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PGOV PHUM PREL GG KDEM
SUBJECT: LISTS OF SANCTIONED ENTITIES DELIVERED TO 
GOVERNMENT 
 
REF: A. STATE 61363 
     B. STATE 62052 
     C. STATE 65133 
     D. STATE 65511 
     E. STATE 68510 
 
1. (SBU) Summary: Poloffs visited the new headquarters of the 
Financial Monitoring Service (FMS) and the Financial 
Supervisory Agency (FSA) and delivered reftel lists of 
sanctioned organizations to Giorgi Kadagidze of FSA. Poloffs 
learned little about money laundering in Abkhazia because 
neither service has a grasp or insight into the complexities 
of Abkhaz banking.  The FMS attributes many of the problems 
to Russian banks illegally operating in Abkhazia despite the 
Russian's outright denial of their presence.  The Financial 
Action Task Force (FATF) addresses money laundering 
internationally but Russia is a member of this organization 
and according to FMS, prevents any progress in invesigating 
money laundering in Abkhazia. In 2007, FMS identified 17 
money laundering cases in Georgia.  Related properties were 
confiscated and arrests were made. In 2008, four cases have 
been reported.  End Summary. 
 
2. (SBU) Poloffs visited the new site of Georgia's Financial 
Monitoring Service (FMS) and the Financial Supervisory Agency 
(FSA).  Both offices have been relocated to jailed mafia 
member Shakro Kalashov's newly constructed and recently 
confiscated mansion in the hills of Tskhneti overlooking 
Tbilisi.  Kalashov is currently serving a twelve year 
sentence in Spain and has an eighteen year sentence in 
Georgia pending his return. 
 
3. (SBU) According to Kadagidze, head of the FSA, the FSA is 
the financial regulator responsible for disseminating 
information and oversight of the financial markets.  FMS is 
Georgia's financial intelligence unit and responsible for 
monitoring terrorist fiances. As requested by the reftels, 
Poloffs delivered demarches and the agencies will update 
their databases and disseminate the information to the 
designated people. 
 
4. (SBU) Poloffs asked FMS if they are able to provide any 
information on money laundering in Abkhazia. FMS conveyed to 
Poloffs that they have no mechanism to monitor money 
laundering in Abkhazia or South Ossetia.  Georgia has the 
backing of Moneyval - an international oversight mechanism - 
that has excused Georgia from obligations to influence these 
regions because they are beyond Georgia's control. FMS told 
Poloffs they have sent letters to Russia regarding Russian 
banks' involvement with Abkhaz banks.  Russia officially 
denies their involvement in Abkhazia. FMS told Poloffs that 
they do not maintain contact with Abkhazia because they do 
not want to officially recognize the Abkhaz de-facto 
government presence. There is one bank in the Georgian 
controlled Kodori Gorge that distributes pensions.  There are 
no banks in Gali at all. 
TEFFT

Wikileaks

08TBILISI1246, GEORGIA: OSCE HUMAN DIMENSION MEETING DEMARCHE

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
08TBILISI1246 2008-07-18 13:28 2011-08-30 01:44 UNCLASSIFIED Embassy Tbilisi

VZCZCXRO0945
PP RUEHAG RUEHAST RUEHDA RUEHDF RUEHFL RUEHIK RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHLN
RUEHLZ RUEHPOD RUEHROV RUEHSR RUEHVK RUEHYG
DE RUEHSI #1246 2001328
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 181328Z JUL 08
FM AMEMBASSY TBILISI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 9780
INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE

UNCLAS TBILISI 001246 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR EUR/CARC 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PARM PREL NATO OSCE GG
SUBJECT: GEORGIA: OSCE HUMAN DIMENSION MEETING DEMARCHE 
DELIVERED 
 
REF: SECSTATE 76294 
 
 1. Per reftel request, Poloff provided a copy of USG 
concerns and comments to Alexander Nalbandov, Director of 
Department of International Organizations, Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs. 
TEFFT

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08TBILISI1245, RECENT DOMESTIC DEVELOPMENTS

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
08TBILISI1245 2008-07-18 13:24 2011-08-30 01:44 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Tbilisi

VZCZCXRO0935
PP RUEHAG RUEHAST RUEHDA RUEHDF RUEHFL RUEHIK RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHLN
RUEHLZ RUEHPOD RUEHROV RUEHSR RUEHVK RUEHYG
DE RUEHSI #1245/01 2001324
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 181324Z JUL 08
FM AMEMBASSY TBILISI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 9778
INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 TBILISI 001245 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR EUR/CARC 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PREL PGOV PHUM KDEM GG
SUBJECT: RECENT DOMESTIC DEVELOPMENTS 
 
REF: TBILISI 925 
 
1. (SBU) Summary: The parliamentary minority faction has 
nominated one of three vice-speaker positions in Parliament 
reserved for opposition lawmakers and has filled deputy 
chairmen positions on parliamentary committees.  The 
Parliamentary Committee for Procedural Issues rejected the 
Labor Party's appeal to renounce their MP mandates on the 
grounds that the appeal was not written appropriately. 
Parliament has formally repealed twelve of the 31 opposition 
politicians MP mandates.  End Summary. 
 
Opposition Receives Positions in Parliament 
------------------------------------------- 
 
2. (SBU) The parliamentary minority, involving the newly 
established 12-member faction, "Strong Georgia - Christian 
Democrats", nominated MP Levan Vepkhvadze of the 
Christian-Democratic Movement (CDM) for the parliamentary 
vice-speaker position.  Though the remaining two vice speaker 
positions are not expected to be filled, three vice speaker 
positions out of nine have been reserved for opposition 
lawmakers  In addition, members of parliament's opposition 
faction have been given deputy chairman positions on the 
following parliamentary committees: 
 
-- Paata Davitaia, leader of On Our Own Party, Foreign 
Relations Committee 
-- Nika Laliashvili, CDM, Defense and Security Committee 
-- Dimitri Lortkipanidze, On Our Own Party, Human Rights and 
Civil Integration Committee 
-- Gia Tsagareishvili, non-aligned, Legal Issues Committee 
-- Roman Marsigashvili, former Republican Party member, 
Agrarian Committee 
-- Carlo Kopaliani, former Republican Party member, Economy 
Sector Committee 
-- Magda Anikashvili, CDM, Healthcare Committee 
-- Giorgi Akhvlediani, CDM, Education, Science, Culture 
Committee 
 
Ruling Party Welcomes Opposition Participation 
--------------------------------------------- - 
 
3. (SBU) Speaker of Parliament David Bakradze welcomed the 
creation of the opposition faction and stressed these 
structures would strengthen Parliament. Giorgi Targamadze, 
leader of the minority, said "this will be an active 
minority, who will form as a constructive, moderate 
opposition oriented on results."  The ruling party has made 
the following steps in an effort to work with the opposition: 
 
-- Parliament adopted a draft law to include an opposition 
member in the Council of Justice.  The opposition already 
decided that their representative in the Council of Justice 
will be another former member of the United Opposition, Gia 
Tsagareishvili. 
 
-- A constitutional amendment was initiated which would 
decrease the minimal number of MPs required to form a faction 
from seven to six. 
 
-- Parliament is working to compose a "group of trust" 
consisting of ruling party and opposition members considered 
to be reliable.  The amendment envisages a group that would 
incorporate four members from the majority and two members 
from the opposition, allowing the opposition to participate 
more actively in Parliament 
 
Parliament Refuses to Cancel 
Labor Party Mandates 
---------------------------- 
 
4. (SBU) The Parliamentary Committee for Procedural Issues 
rejected the Labor Party's appeal to renounce their MP 
mandates on the grounds that it was not written 
appropriately.  Four MPs from the Labor Party, including its 
leader Shalva Natelashvili, wrote in the official appeal that 
the Labor Party wanted to withdraw from the "headquarters of 
the ruling party."  The Labor Party explained that it does 
not recognize Parliament as a legitimately elected body and 
would not refer to it as the Parliament of Georgia. 
 
5. (SBU) As a result of the Labor Party's inability to 
renounce their MPs, Kakha Kukava of the Conservative Party 
and Giorgi Gugava of the Labor Party went head-to-head on a 
Kavkasia TV talk show on June 30.  Gugava sidestepped a 
direct question about whether or not his party would make a 
repeat appeal to Parliament.  Parliament has formally 
repealed twelve of the 31 opposition politicians MP mandates. 
 Two of the Labor Party's six MPs have entered Parliament 
 
TBILISI 00001245  002 OF 002 
 
 
while the other four, including Natelashvili, are not engaged 
in parliamentary activities.  The Labor Party MPs are 
receiving salaries from Parliament though they claim they are 
not taking them.  (Comment: Post understands that 
Natelashvili is still interested in taking his party's seats 
in Parliament.  End Comment). 
 
 
 
TEFFT

Wikileaks

08TBILISI1241, IDP RETURNEES TO GALI FACE CHALLENGES BEYOND

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
08TBILISI1241 2008-07-17 13:43 2011-08-30 01:44 UNCLASSIFIED Embassy Tbilisi

VZCZCXRO9842
PP RUEHAG RUEHAST RUEHDA RUEHDF RUEHFL RUEHIK RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHLN
RUEHLZ RUEHPOD RUEHROV RUEHSR RUEHVK RUEHYG
DE RUEHSI #1241/01 1991343
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 171343Z JUL 08
FM AMEMBASSY TBILISI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 9771
INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 TBILISI 001241 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT. FOR EUR/CARC, PRM 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PREL PGOV PHUM GG
SUBJECT: IDP RETURNEES TO GALI FACE CHALLENGES BEYOND 
SECURITY 
 
REF: TBILISI 2146 
 
1. Summary and Comment:  Poloff traveled to the largely 
ethnic-Georgian Gali district of the breakaway Republic of 
Abkhazia June 23-25 to learn more about the lives of Georgian 
internally displaced persons (IDPs) who had returned to their 
homes. Many of the estimated 40,000 IDPs who have returned to 
Gali depend on subsistence agriculture, hazelnut and mandarin 
farming, and small-scale trading of everyday goods.  They 
have either returned to their own homes or have moved into 
the home of a relative, though many of the homes in the 
region have been destroyed. Many of the IDPs that remain 
displaced inside Georgia proper have not returned because of 
a combination of factors: their homes were destroyed during 
the war, lack of economic opportunities, safety, and ongoing 
Abkhaz hostility to the return of ethnic Georgians north of 
Gali.  UN police stationed in Gali report that crime rates 
dropped last year, though there are still seasonal spikes in 
crime during the hazelnut harvest in October. 
 
2. Summary and Comment continued: Many of the ethnic 
Georgians who fled Gali during the war returned within a few 
years, only to flee again when hostilities resumed in 1998. 
President Saakashvili's disbanding of the Georgian 
government-backed paramilitary groups following his election 
in 2003 and an extensive demining program (partially funded 
by the USG) along the Inguri river vastly improved the 
security situation in Gali, paving the way for large-scale 
return of IDPs there.  The United Nations High Commission for 
Refugees (UNHCR) estimates that approximately 40,000 IDPs 
have returned since 2003.  The timely return of the remaining 
230,000 IDPs remains a key priority for the Georgian 
government, though creating the conditions for safe and 
voluntary return will be a challenge.  The Abkhaz remain 
strongly opposed to IDP return north of Gali out of concern 
they will become a minority in their own "country."  Property 
disputes, lack of housing, decaying infrastructure and a 
stagnant, corrupt economy point to millions of dollars and 
years of rehabilitation before most would be willing to call 
Abkhazia home again.  End Summary and Comment. 
 
Many IDPs have limited options 
------------------------------ 
3.  Poloff spoke with IDPs on both sides of the conflict 
zone, both returnees and those still displaced, to get an 
accurate picture of conditions for each group.  Many of the 
IDPs originally from Gali live in Zugdidi, on the Georgian 
side of the conflict zone, surviving on a 27 lari (USD 19) a 
month stipend from the Georgian government.  Most 
occasionally return to visit relatives, mainly grandparents, 
living in Gali, but otherwise stay on the Georgian side 
living in remote, dilapidated collective centers or renting 
rooms from local families.  Those fortunate enough to have 
arable land in Gali (but remain wary of returning 
permanently) migrate each summer to tend to their hazelnut 
and mandarin crops, returning to Zugdidi during the winter. 
Many other IDPs have found themselves stuck between having 
land to farm but no home in Gali or having a home (usually a 
collective housing center) in Georgia but no land or work. 
IDPs who have returned to their homes in Gali manage to 
survive by selling hazelnuts and mandarins, or by small scale 
trading of goods from Georgia.  These returnees nevertheless 
face daily harassment, bureaucratic obstacles and high and 
often arbitrary taxes and fines imposed by Abkhaz officials. 
 
4.  The "Tea Plantation" collective center is a twenty minute 
drive from Zugdidi, remotely located atop a hill at the end 
of a long, winding dirt road.  Approximately 85 IDPs live in 
dorms with drooping roofs and warped floors that formerly 
served as homes for workers at the plantation.  The 
plantation, which is no longer operating, was privatized by 
the Georgian government three years ago, though no one knows 
what plans the new owner has for the complex.  IDPs living 
here are thus stuck in decrepit two-story dorms, crumbling 
from age and neglect, because no one is willing to invest 
money into their repair out of fear that once the repairs are 
finished, the owner will kick the IDPs out and sell the 
property for a profit.  The plantation's remote location 
makes it difficult for the IDPs living there to find work in 
Zugdidi, and all the families we spoke with relied 
exclusively on their 27 lari/month stipend, renting land from 
locals to grow food crops.  A few IDPs from the collective 
center have returned to Gali, but the majority cannot because 
they have no place to go.  Several saw their houses burned 
down during the war, while others from Ochimchire and further 
north said Abkhaz legal restrictions and general hostility to 
Georgians has kept them away. 
 
Abkhaz bureaucratic harassment 
------------------------------ 
 
TBILISI 00001241  002 OF 003 
 
 
5.  According to the UN human rights office in Gali, IDP 
returnees are regularly harassed by local Abkhaz 
administration o
fficials, border guards and customs 
officials, though in practice this seems more prevalent in 
the town of Gali and north toward Ochimchire.  The UN human 
rights officer, Ryszard Komenda, characterized this 
harassment as more ethnic discrimination than physical 
intimidation and threats of violence.  Much of the harassment 
exists to make everyday life a chore for ethnic Georgians who 
have returned - forcing them to return 2-3 times to 
government offices to complete routine paperwork, imposing 
arbitrary taxes on goods bought and sold, and subjecting 
those crossing administrative borders to lengthy questioning 
and demands for bribes.  Zugdidi residents deal with frequent 
closings of the main bridge over the Inguri river and are 
often forced to pay bribes as high as 1000 rubles (USD 40) 
each time they cross. 
 
6.  The 2005 Abkhaz citizenship law added another layer to 
this official harassment, making it much harder for ethnic 
Georgians living in Gali to conduct routine business without 
an Abkhaz "passport."  Gali residents cannot open a bank 
account, (legally) own property or travel beyond Gali without 
one.  The Gali district is the last district in Abkhazia to 
undergo the Abkhaz passportization process, which began there 
in March 2008.  Komenda said there has not been much interest 
from IDP returnees in getting passports because they do not 
see any real benefits to gaining Abkhaz citizenship, nor has 
there been much pressure (yet) from Abkhaz authorities to 
force the issue.  He noted that while they issue as many as 
400 new Abkhaz passports a week in Gagra, only four had been 
issued in Gali over the past few months.  It is widely 
thought that de-facto president Bagapsh will push for more 
Gali residents to have passports by the end of the year, so 
they can vote in the upcoming 2009 'presidential' elections 
(note: Gali residents' support is widely thought to have 
secured Bagapsh's victory in the 2004 election.  Gali 
residents can skirt the passport law by signing a 
(non-binding) waiver "renouncing" their Georgian citizenship, 
which allows them to keep their Georgian passport, though not 
many have done so, perhaps out of concern that they will lose 
their IDP stipends paid by the Georgian government. End note). 
 
Southern Gali 
------------- 
7.  Abkhaz checkpoints and harassment by de-facto officials 
does not seem to be as pervasive in the southern part of Gali 
district, where ethnic Georgians can cross over into Georgia 
without having to cross the Inguri river.  Poloff spoke with 
returnees from the villages of Otobaya and Nabakevi, 
recipients of UNHCR small business grants.  Several of the 
returnees we spoke with had used the grants to set up small 
roadside kiosks, selling products purchased in Georgia. 
Others purchased dairy cows or seeds for growing crops. 
Nearly all supplemented their meager incomes by selling 
hazelnuts and mandarins, which grow in abundance in the 
region.  Zurab, a returnee in the village of Otobaya, used 
UNHCR's USD 300 grant to build a small roadside kiosk, where 
he sells staples such as flour, sugar, oil, gum, and 
cigarettes purchased in Georgia.  Despite the recent 
escalation of tension between Georgia and Abkhazia, he said 
he felt safe and has had no problems transporting goods 
across the administrative boundary.  He also said he harvests 
between 300-400 kg of hazelnuts each year, selling them for 
about 3 lari/kg (about USD 2/kg), and netting between 
750-1050 lari (USD 528-740) after paying taxes to Abkhaz 
de-facto authorities. 
 
8.  Most returnees are not as fortunate as Zurab, however.  A 
UNHCR official noted that most families sell their hazelnut 
crops a year or more in advance to make ends meet, and 
harvest yields vary considerably.  Taxes levied by the 
de-facto authorities are often arbitrary and steep.  While 
Zurab said he paid only about 80 lari (USD 56) in taxes on 
his hazelnuts, some villages, particularly those north of 
Gali, are forced to pay a tax of 100-120kg of hazelnuts to 
the de-facto authorities.  Those who have small hazelnut 
groves or a bad harvest are forced to buy nuts on the open 
market to pay the tax. 
 
UN: Crime not a serious problem in Gali 
--------------------------------------- 
 
9.  The UN police observers stationed in Gali-Zugdidi noted 
that crime in Gali and Ochimchre was "not that bad" 
considering the size of the population (Note: this 
conversation took place before the recent string of bombings 
in Abkhazia, including the blast at a Gali cafe that killed 
an off-duty UN interpreter.  End note).  They said that out 
of a population of 95,000, they report between 2-8 crimes per 
 
TBILISI 00001241  003 OF 003 
 
 
month, mostly robberies or bride kidnappings.  They 
characterized Georgian media reporting on the criminal 
situation in Gali as exaggerated, and the crimes that are 
reported are often ethnic Georgians targeting other ethnic 
Georgians.  Because of the depressed economy and relative 
poverty of the population, there is not much to steal, save 
mandarins and hazelnuts - harvest season is when they see the 
largest spikes in criminal activity.  They noted that Abkhaz 
police are largely corrupt and unprofessional, showing almost 
no interest in UN police training programs.  They also 
assessed the feasibility of a joint Georgian-Abkhaz police 
force to be remote at best, given the inherent mistrust 
between the sides and the vast gap in professional standards 
between the two police forces. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
TEFFT

Wikileaks

08TBILISI1239, POLOFF DISCUSSES TROOP LEVEL AND DEFENSE SPENDING

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
08TBILISI1239 2008-07-17 12:28 2011-08-30 01:44 UNCLASSIFIED Embassy Tbilisi

VZCZCXRO9748
PP RUEHAG RUEHAST RUEHDA RUEHDF RUEHFL RUEHIK RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHLN
RUEHLZ RUEHPOD RUEHROV RUEHSR RUEHVK RUEHYG
DE RUEHSI #1239 1991228
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 171228Z JUL 08
FM AMEMBASSY TBILISI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 9770
INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE
RHEHAAA/NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASHINGTON DC

UNCLAS TBILISI 001239 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR EUR/CARC 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: KDEM PHUM PREL PGOV GG
SUBJECT: POLOFF DISCUSSES TROOP LEVEL AND DEFENSE SPENDING 
INCREASE WITH MFA 
 
 1. (SBU) Summary: Poloff met with the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs (MFA) Desk Officer for the United States, Irakli 
Machitidze, Director of Department of International 
Organizations, Alexander Nalbandov and Head of NATO Division, 
Tornike Parulava regarding press reports that Georgia is 
planning to increase their troop numbers by 5000 while also 
increasing their military spending. Parulava told Poloff that 
this will not be a sixth brigade, instead, the 5000 troops 
will be dispersed amongst the current five brigades and 
Parulava emphasized there are no plans to create a sixth 
brigade.  According to Parulava, the 5000 troops will mainly 
support the air force and the Ministry of Defense is 
specifically seeking people with technical backgrounds such 
as engineers.  Nika Rurua, Deputy Chairman for Defense and 
Security confirmed to the Ambassador that Georgia will not 
create a sixth brigade. 
 
2. (SBU) Parulava informed Poloff that the decision to 
increase military spending and troop numbers was made quickly 
because Parliament was dispersing for the summer and a 
decision was needed immediately.  The additional troops will 
be used to support domestic troop levels including 
peacekeeping operations.  In addition, Georgia is currently 
reworking their Threat Assessment because it is outdated and 
no longer accounts for the imminent Russian threat. 
 
3. (SBU) Parulava informed Poloff on 16 July that Deputy 
Defense Minister Muchaidze is currently in Brussels to 
discuss Georgia's decision with NATO officials though 
Parulava does not anticipate any problems because Georgia is 
still under the CFE troop limits. 
TEFFT

Wikileaks

08TBILISI1229, GEORGIA: EFFECTIVENESS OF UN EFFORTS TO COMBAT

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
08TBILISI1229 2008-07-16 13:45 2011-08-30 01:44 UNCLASSIFIED Embassy Tbilisi

VZCZCXYZ0000
OO RUEHWEB

DE RUEHSI #1229 1981345
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O 161345Z JUL 08
FM AMEMBASSY TBILISI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 9757
INFO RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 4650

UNCLAS TBILISI 001229 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR IO/PSC & EUR/CARC 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PREL PHUM KPKO GG
SUBJECT: GEORGIA: EFFECTIVENESS OF UN EFFORTS TO COMBAT 
SEXUAL EXPLOITATION AND ABUSE IN UN PEACEKEEPING MISSIONS 
 
REF: A. SECSTATE 68780 
     B. TBILISI 68 
 
1. In response to ref A, post provides information on 
Trafficking in Persons (TIP) and Sexual Exploitation and 
Abuse (SEA) in relation to the United Nations Observer 
Mission in Georgia (UNOMIG).  This report combines input 
solicited from Georgian law enforcement officials, 
international organizations, NGO experts on TIP, and 
representatives from the UNOMIG office in Tbilisi.  As post 
has noted in previous reports, due to the isolated nature of 
UNOMIG in the separatist region of Abkhazia, it remains a 
challenge for our Georgian sources -- who are prohibited from 
traveling to the region -- to comment with complete certainty 
on the activities of UNOMIG staff. 
 
2. There is no NGO, popular, or government perception that 
UNOMIG is involved in TIP or SEA in Georgia.  The prosecutor 
General's office confirmed to us that there have been no 
investigations of UNOMIG officials in connection with such 
abuses.  Officials from both the International Organization 
for Migration (IOM) and the Anti-Violence Network of Georgia, 
a leading NGO combating crimes against women, told us they 
had no information connecting UNOMIG personnel to any such 
abuses. 
 
3. UNOMIG officials informed us that SEA issues are handled 
in the mission by two SEA focal points.  Their 
responsibilities are three-fold: training of all categories 
of mission staff, dissemination of information, and follow-up 
on allegations of SEA.  In December 2007, UNOMIG's Conduct 
and Discipline Unit (which was set up in August 2007), 
completed a round of briefings with all categories of mission 
staff to refresh everyone's knowledge of UN Conduct policies; 
briefings are also provided to all incoming staff.  These 
briefings contain a specific section on SEA and related 
issues.  Despite limited access to the local Abkhaz 
population, the Conduct and Discipline Unit conducted as 
planned (ref B) a small public information campaign and 
awareness-raising activities with external partners during 
the first half of 2008. 
TEFFT

Wikileaks