Monthly Archives: December 2008

08TBILISI2498, SCENESETTER FOR SECRETARY RICE’S MEETING WITH

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
08TBILISI2498 2008-12-31 10:52 2011-08-30 01:44 CONFIDENTIAL Embassy Tbilisi

O 311052Z DEC 08
FM AMEMBASSY TBILISI
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0647

C O N F I D E N T I A L TBILISI 002498 
 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/29/2018 
TAGS: PGOV PREL RU GG
SUBJECT: SCENESETTER FOR SECRETARY RICE'S MEETING WITH 
GEORGIAN FM VASHADZE 
 
REF: TBILISI 2495 
 
Classified By: Ambassador John F. Tefft for reasons 1.4 (B) and (D). 
 
OVERVIEW 
 
1.  (C)  New Georgian Foreign Minister Grigol Vashadze's 
first visit to the United States will be an auspicious one, 
featuring the signing of the US-Georgian Charter on Strategic 
Partnership.  The Georgian government is enthusiastic about 
the content and timing of the Charter, viewing it as a major 
recommitment of the US to Georgia's sovereignty and security. 
 Vashadze will likely tell you that this is exactly the kind 
of message needed in the current international environment. 
Vashadze will lead a group of Ministers and the Supreme Court 
Justice to the signing to underscore the seriousness with 
which the Georgian government plans to implement the 
agreement. 
 
2.  (C) Vashadze is looking forward to discussing with you 
the current challenges facing the country, specifically what 
is viewed in Tbilisi as the continuing Russian threat.  As 
the main Georgian interlocutor with the Russians for the past 
year, Vashadze will be able to give you his personal 
assessment of the current Russian approach.  The visit 
provides us the opportunity to commend the Georgians for 
their continuing restraint in the face of ongoing 
provocations from both South Ossetia and Abkhazia.  Vashadze 
will likely be interested in discussing the future of 
international monitoring, in the wake of the recent failure 
to renew the OSCE mandate for Georgia, and the possible 
threat to UNOMIG renewal in February. 
 
 
THE SECURITY SITUATION 
 
3.  (C) Georgian leaders hope that with the onset of winter, 
the prospects for renewed Russian violence toward Georgia 
have declined.  Nevertheless, they remain worried that the 
Russian army or FSB will encourage further attacks or 
provocations on the boundaries with South Ossetia and 
Abkhazia.  There is particular concern in Tbilisi (and among 
European Union Monitors and UNOMIG monitors) about the 
possibility of the Abkhaz/Russians seizing three pieces of 
still Georgian-occupied land on the north side of the Enguri 
River, the de facto boundary with Abkhazia.  There is also 
government and public concern that Georgian policemen 
continue to be killed or seriously wounded in cross-border 
shootings or attacks by the South Ossetians and Abkhaz, as 
well as possible Russian snipers. (para 2 Tbilisi 2495) 
 
4.  (C) Vashadze's visit provides an opportunity to applaud 
the Georgians' restraint in the face of these continuing 
provocations from both South Ossetia and Abkhazia into 
undisputed Georgian territory.  You can also draw out 
Vashadze on Georgian thinking regarding future relations with 
the territories.  President Saakashvili and Vashadze told 
Matt Bryza three weeks ago that they accept the "carrots and 
sticks" policy which we suggested be applied toward the 
territories.  The government has not, however, spelled out in 
any detail its plans for the regions. 
 
 
GEORGIA WITHOUT THE OSCE AND UNOMIG? 
 
5.  (C) Georgia has long said that no OSCE mandate was better 
than a bad one which would in any way recognize the 
independence of Abkhazia and South Ossetia.  However, the 
Georgians would clearly prefer the continuation of any and 
all international monitors if suitable arrangements can be 
worked out. They know that now Russia has blocked the renewal 
of the OSCE mission in Georgia, practical issues must be 
addressed.  They will want the EU to continue its mission, 
despite the Russian refusal to permit monitors into South 
Ossetia or Abkhazia.  Your meeting with Vashadze will present 
an opportunity to discuss the future of the UNOMIG mandate. 
So far the Russians and Abkhaz continue to hang tough in 
QSo far the Russians and Abkhaz continue to hang tough in 
their insistence onrevising the name of UNOMIG in order to 
legitimize the government in Sukhumi and Tskhinvali. 
Vashadze will likely seek your views on coordinating 
international pressure on the Russians to permit the 
continuation of UNOMIG, when the  mandate comes up for 
renewal on February 15, 2009. 
 
 
GENEVA - WHERE WILL IT LEAD? 
 
6.  (C) Vashadze and Deputy Foreign Minister Bokeria have 
been the key Georgian representatives at the Geneva talks. 
Although they recognize little progress has been made, they 
see value in keeping the forum going.  Ironically, Geneva 
provides the broader international forum on both territories 
which the Georgians have been seeking for years.  With the 
next round of Geneva discussions set for mid-February, we 
suggest you draw out Vashadze on Georgia's expectations for 
the future.  He is well aware that the next round will be in 
the hands of the incoming Administration, but we believe it 
is worthwhile to encourage him to be creative in the Georgian 
approach to the discussion. 
 
 
ECONOMIC CHALLENGES AND APP POTI PROPOSAL 
 
5.  (C) Vashadze can brief you on Georgia's efforts to manage 
the economic fallout of the war and even more now the 
international economic crisis.  So far Georgia is managing 
but the international credit crunch is starting to slow 
business and lead to layoffs.  We expect that Vashadze will 
thank you for the continuing ship v
isits by the Sixth Fleet 
(the USS Taylor was in Poti this week).  He has also told us 
he may raise the idea of opening a small US post in Poti 
(i.e. American Presence Post).  While it is clearly in 
Georgia,s interest to have an official American presence 
near Georgia,s major Black Sea port and close to Russian 
positions in Abkhazia, it also could provide the U.S. with 
much more direct knowledge of events in western Georgia. 
 
 
VASHADZE - A DIFFERENT KIND OF FOREIGN MINISTER 
 
6.  (C) Grigol Vashadze (known as Grigory or Gia to his 
friends) was appointed Foreign Minister by President 
Saakashvili on December 10, 2008.  Prior to taking up his 
position, he served as Minister of Culture for approximately 
one month and as Deputy Foreign Minister for nearly ten 
months.  He had been brought to that position by Saakashvili 
to help him work with the Russians.  Vashadze is different 
from the other Georgian Foreign Ministers you have worked 
with.  Now 50 he served as a Soviet diplomat earlier in his 
career and then as a businessman in Russia.  He has both 
Georgian and Russian citizenship.  Born in Tbilisi, Vashadze 
graduated from Moscow State Institute of International 
Relations in 1981.  He then joined the Soviet Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs, while simultaneously receiving a master,s 
degree in international law at the Soviet Diplomatic Academy. 
 During his career at the Soviet Foreign Ministry, Vashadze 
represented the USSR at chemical weapons negotiations.  He 
was asked to leave the Foreign Ministry in 1987 when -- 
according to his account -- he took Gorbachev's perestroika 
too seriously for his superiors.  At that time he fell in 
love with and married Nina Ananiashvili, then already a 
famous Bolshoi prima ballerina.  Vashadze helped manage her 
career and developed business interests in Moscow and then in 
New York, when Ananiashvili became the first Soviet dancer to 
appear as a guest performer at the New York City Ballet in 
1988.  She subsequently became a principal dancer for the 
American Ballet Theater in 1993 and in 1999 joined the 
Houston Ballet.  Vashadze returned to Georgia with his wife, 
when she was appointed Artistic Director of the Georgian 
Ballet in September 2004.  Ananiashvili is also the godmother 
to President Saakashvili,s youngest son, Nikoloz. 
 
 
TEFFT

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08TBILISI2495, GEORGIA: SOUTH OSSETIA INCIDENTS: LESS FATAL, BUT

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
08TBILISI2495 2008-12-30 14:56 2011-08-30 01:44 CONFIDENTIAL Embassy Tbilisi

VZCZCXRO7115
OO RUEHFL RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHNP RUEHROV RUEHSR
DE RUEHSI #2495/01 3651456
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 301456Z DEC 08
FM AMEMBASSY TBILISI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0642
INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING PRIORITY 0160
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY 4753
RUEHBS/USEU BRUSSELS PRIORITY
RUEHVEN/USMISSION USOSCE PRIORITY 2233

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 TBILISI 002495 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR EUR/CARC 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/30/2018 
TAGS: PGOV PREL MOPS KBTS RU GG
SUBJECT: GEORGIA: SOUTH OSSETIA INCIDENTS: LESS FATAL, BUT 
BOLD 
 
REF: A. TBILISI 2176 
     B. HTTP://WWW.EUMM.EU/EN/PRESS_AND_PUBLIC_INFORM ATIO- 
        N/PRESS_RELEASES/668/ 
     C. TBILISI 2492 
 
Classified By: Ambassador John F. Tefft for Reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). 
 
1. (C)  Summary.  Although the area around South Ossetia has 
not seen any conflict-related fatalities since November 17, 
several recent incidents have caused injuries and shown a 
brazen attitude by the South Ossetian or Russian 
perpetrators.  Georgian Interior Ministry forces have been 
the targets of a December 5 guided missile, a December 10 
roadside bomb, a December 18 machine-gun attack, and a 
December 27 shooting; the roadside bomb was placed near 
Pkhvenisi, 8 kilometers outside the administrative boundary. 
International monitors have also been targeted; an EUMM 
patrol was threatened at gunpoint on December 6, and an OSCE 
vehicle was attacked on December 10.  Meanwhile both Perevi 
and Akhalgori remain problematic.  Reports of random shooting 
are already increasing as the New Year approaches, causing 
fears of further escalation; drunkenness could cause 
problems; and the likely departure of the OSCE military 
monitors on February 18 could cause further destabilization. 
An Interior Ministry official downplayed concerns in the 
immediate term, saying the cold weather will keep people 
indoors and make it harder to shoot them, but he also 
suggested that Russia wants to keep the situation along the 
boundary tense in order to maintain pressure on the Georgian 
government.  End summary. 
 
INTERIOR MINISTRY STILL UNDER FIRE 
 
2. (C) Since the November 17 killing of two and wounding of 
three Georgian Interior Ministry officials (ref A), post is 
unaware of any fatalities on either side of the South 
Ossetian administrative boundary.  Attacks have continued, 
however, with most originating inside South Ossetia and 
targeting Georgian Interior Ministry officials, usually 
within a short distance of the boundary.  On December 5, the 
OSCE reported a guided missile struck a stable next to the 
police station in Mereti, causing significant damage to the 
structure and injuring a cow; the EUMM reported the missile 
originated in Disevi, inside South Ossetia.  The OSCE 
reported an anti-tank missile landed in the town of Atotsi on 
December 21, doing no significant damage.  On December 18 the 
OSCE reported a police officer was slightly wounded in a 
machine-gun attack in Khurvaleti; another police officer was 
slighly wounded by gunfire near Ditsi on December 27. 
Director of the Interior Ministry Analytical Department Shota 
Utiashvili told EmbOff the bullet came from a "vintorez," 
which he described as a $60,000 specialized sniper rifle that 
Ossetians generally would not have, but that Russian special 
forces are often provided. 
 
3. (C) On December 10, however, the EUMM and OSCE reported 
the rear of an Interior Ministry vehicle was damaged by an 
improvised explosive device on the road near a bridge in 
Pkhvenisi, eight kilometers from the administrative boundary; 
one officer was slightly wounded.  The fact that the rear of 
the vehicle was damaged, not the front, indicated to both 
monitoring missions that the device did not detonate upon 
impact, but was remotely detonated, either by wire or radio. 
Although the perpetrators remain unknown, if they originated 
in South Ossetia, they had to travel well beyond the boundary 
Qin South Ossetia, they had to travel well beyond the boundary 
in order to set the device and then detonate it.  This 
incident could reflect a new willingness on the part of the 
attackers to reach farther outside of South Ossetia into 
areas that had generally been considered secure. 
 
4. (C) On December 20, the Interior Ministry told the EUMM 
that it would begin deploying COBRA armored vehicles in the 
area around South Ossetia, and both the EUMM and OSCE (and 
UNOMIG outside Abkhazia) have since observed them in the 
field.  The EUMM publicly criticized the deployment, 
suggesting that the use of such vehicles although not a 
violatin of the cease-fire agreement, would not enhance 
security on the ground.  The EUMM statement further noted 
that, although ten Georgian police officers have been killed 
since the end of the war, none of those incidents would have 
been prevented by armored vehicles (ref B).  In private, the 
EUMM expressed its concern that the Georgian use of the 
COBRAs endangers its own EUMM monitors, because some -- the 
Polish contingent in the Gori field office and the Italian 
contingent in the Zugdidi field office -- use similar 
vehicles.  It also noted that following more regular standard 
 
TBILISI 00002495  002 OF 003 
 
 
operating procedures would have done more to protect the 
Georgians, and furthermore suggested that the use of armor
ed 
vehicles might actually encourage attackers to shoot.  (Post 
comment: The EUMM public arguments are not convincing to the 
Georgians and many diplomats, because the EUMM monitors 
themselves always use armored vehicles.  The real concern is 
what they expressed to us privately: that their own monitors 
not be confused with Georgian forces and attacked.  One could 
argue that the use of the COBRAs, which have a more military 
appearance than traditional police vehicles, increases the 
perception of militarization along the boundary (although 
some EUMM vehicles have a similar appearance), but it is hard 
to find fault with the Georgian side taking a step to protect 
its personnel -- the same step taken by all three 
international monitoring missions.  End comment.) 
 
MONITORS ALSO IN THE CROSSHAIRS 
 
5. (SBU) On December 6, the EUMM reported drunk Ossetian 
militia threatened an EUMM patrol with a pistol in Didi 
Gromi.  An OSCE monitor told EmbOff that an EUMM patrol was 
forced out of its vehicle and held for over an hour at 
gunpoint; this may have been the same December 6 incident. 
On December 10, outside the South Ossetian boundary near Zemo 
Khviti, an unidentified individual in partial uniform 
suddenly appeared before an OSCE patrol from behind some 
bushes, drew a weapon, and fired into the air.  As the 
vehicle began withdrawing, a second individual, also in 
partial uniform, appeared from behind some bushes and fired 
directly at the vehicle, hitting it several times.  The 
vehicle was armored, and no one was injured.  This was the 
first such direct attack on any monitors since the war. 
 
6. (C) The December 10 attackers appeared to the OSCE to be 
laying in wait for them.  Although the immediate 
circumstances are somewhat inconclusive -- the attackers may 
have been surprised by the patrol -- an OSCE monitor 
suggested to EmbOff it was most likely premeditated, offering 
the following explanation.  On December 1, an OSCE patrol 
witnessed an individual stop a white Lada across the 
administrative boundary from Zemo Khviti (the same location 
as the December 10 attack), remove an automatic weapon from 
the trunk, and fire a single shot toward the village (no one 
was injured).  The OSCE patrol then revealed itself, and the 
individual quickly drove off.  One week later, in the same 
location, an Ossetian soldier warned another OSCE monitor to 
stay away from the area.  Two days later, on December 10, an 
OSCE patrol returned to the spot to show it had not been 
intimidated -- and was attacked.  The OSCE monitor 
interpreted the attack as retaliation for what was perceived 
to be interference in the Ossetian militia's military 
activities. 
 
HAPPY NEW YEAR! 
 
7. (C) The OSCE has already received increasing reports of 
random shooting along the boundary, probably in connection 
with upcoming New Year's celebrations.  As the administrative 
boundary is so poorly defined and so interlocking, and 
because so many villages on either side of the boundary abut 
each other, any shooting -- even of a celebratory nature -- 
in an already tense atmosphere could easily escalate into 
something more malicious.  Holiday drunkenness -- frequently 
cited by the Georgian government, the EUMM and the OSCE as a 
problem among the Russians and Ossetians anyway -- could make 
Qproblem among the Russians and Ossetians anyway -- could make 
the situation even more unstable.  Analytical Department 
Director Utiashvili did not expect any major difficulties in 
the coming weeks, suggesting that the cold weather will keep 
people indoors, making them more difficult targets.  He 
acknowledged, however, that alcohol could lead to 
misunderstandings and therefore escalations. 
 
COMMENT: BEWARE WASHINGTON'S BIRTHDAY TOO 
 
8. (C) On February 18, the OSCE's military monitoring mission 
is scheduled to close, and post expects it will take some 
time for the EUMM to pick up the slack (ref C).  Utiashvili 
also downplayed this concern, suggesting that the OSCE's lack 
of access to South Ossetia makes the mission unable to have 
much impact now anyway.  He did add, however, that Russia 
probably wants to keep the situation along both the South 
Ossetian and Abkhaz boundaries tense, in order to maintain 
pressure on the Georgian government.  The apparently 
premeditated retaliation against the OSCE for interference in 
potentially attacks suggests to post that the unidentified 
troublemakers roaming the administrative boundary see the 
 
TBILISI 00002495  003 OF 003 
 
 
OSCE as a hindrance to their activities.  End comment. 
TEFFT

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08TBILISI2494, GEORGIA: AND JUSTICE FOR ALL–THE NEW POWER

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
08TBILISI2494 2008-12-30 14:33 2011-08-30 01:44 CONFIDENTIAL Embassy Tbilisi

VZCZCXRO7101
PP RUEHFL RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHNP RUEHROV RUEHSR
DE RUEHSI #2494/01 3651433
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 301433Z DEC 08
FM AMEMBASSY TBILISI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 0640
INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 TBILISI 002494 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR EUR/CARC 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/30/2018 
TAGS: PGOV PHUM GG
SUBJECT: GEORGIA:  AND JUSTICE FOR ALL--THE NEW POWER 
MINISTRY 
 
Classified By: AMBASSADOR JOHN F. TEFFT FOR REASONS 1.4 (B) AND (D). 
 
1.  (U) Summary:  In October, amendments to the Constitution 
of Georgia officially authorized the merger of the 
Prosecution Service of Georgia with the Ministry of Justice. 
The Probation and Penitentiary Department, National Forensics 
Bureau and Legal Aid services, which formerly were 
subordinate to the Ministry of Justice, will now become 
separate entities.  Although the details explaining the 
justification of the merger are scant, those who are familiar 
with the ministry say the merger has been in the works since 
2004.  For some, the merger cements the Ministry of Justice's 
status as a "power ministry," on the same level as that of 
the Ministry of Internal Affairs.  A recent press article 
suggested some cross-fertilization -- i.e., the transplanting 
of MOIA Minister Merabishvili protgs into the new 
Prosecutorial Service -- as a precursor to a possible power 
struggle between MOIA and MOJ as they carve out their 
respective roles.  The future of the new separate entities 
also remains unclear.  End Summary. 
 
The New Setup 
 
2.  (U)  According to a non-paper circulated by the Ministry 
of Justice, the merger is the final step in completing reform 
initiated in 2004.  The Prosecution service will now be 
institutionally subordinate to the Ministry of Justice (MOJ). 
 The law on the Prosecution Service guarantees that no 
government body or official, including the prime minister and 
the president, can repeal legal acts issued by the Minister 
of Justice and/or officials of the Prosecution Service. 
Thus, the new institutional framework balances prosecutorial 
independence vis-a-vis accountability and transparency in the 
formation of criminal justice policy.  According to Georgian 
law, the Minister of Justice is appointed by the Prime 
Minister, with the consent of the President and approval of 
Parliament.  Zurab Adeishvili, who has served previously both 
as Minister of Justice and Prosecutor General, was recently 
announced as the new Minister of Justice.  The Chief 
Prosecutor, Mamuka Gvaramia, was nominated by the Minister of 
Justice and appointed by the President of Georgia. 
 
3.  (C) On December 3, Emboffs met with Archil Giorgadze and 
Tamar Tomashvil, who previously worked at the Prosecutor's 
Human Rights Department.  Since the merger, their department 
has been eliminated and the work distributed among other 
departments. The MOJ's Department of Public International 
Law, of which Giorgadze is the Deputy Head, now works on 
human rights and trafficking-in-persons issues, as well as 
international relations.  Some of the functions of the former 
Human Rights Department in the previous Prosecutor General's 
office were also delegated to the General Inspection 
Department, which supervises investigations, implementation 
of laws and procedural issues. 
 
MOIA and MOJ--the Power Couple 
 
4.  (C)  On December 3, Alia, a gossipy Georgian tabloid, 
featured an article on the relationships between MOIA and 
MOJ, musing aloud about the recent appointees. The article 
suggested that some recent appointments within the 
Prosecution Service -- Gvaramia and David Sakvarelidze 
(Deputy Prosecutor) -- are rewards for past work on 
high-profile cases.  Gvaramia was involved in two cases -- 
Pridon Injia and Giorgi Sanaia -- during the Shevardnadze 
era, and Sakvarelidze instituted criminal charges against 
Mikhail Kareli (former Shida Kartli governor), Vasil 
Makharashvili (mayor of Gori) and Marlen Nadiradze (chairman 
of the Gori City Council). Giorgi Chkheidze, Georgian Young 
Qof the Gori City Council). Giorgi Chkheidze, Georgian Young 
Lawyers Association, told Emboff that most people were 
surprised that neither Nick Gvaramia (appointed Minister of 
Education on December 10 -- no known relation to Mamuka) nor 
Giorgi Latsabidze (former acting prosecutor general) was 
tapped as prosecutor general.  The Alia article portrays 
Mamuka's appointment as a victory for one of Merabishvili's 
protgs and a loss for Giga Bokeria, First Deputy Foreign 
Minister, whose personal pick was Nick Gvaramia.  The same 
article in Alia attributes the selection of Mamuka to a 
handshake deal between Merabishvili and Adeishvili to do some 
cross-pollination between the two organizations. 
 
Probation and Penitentiary Ministry 
 
5.  (C)  According to the reorganization plan, the Probation 
and Penitentiary Service will become an independent entity as 
of January 1, 2009, and the head of the service will be a 
cabinet-level minister.  The prison system has chronic 
problems, and building new prisons does not seem to have 
addressed the overcrowding effectively.  On December 16, 
Bacho Akhalaia, was appointed a Deputy Minister of Defense, 
 
TBILISI 00002494  002 OF 002 
 
 
leaving his role as Head of the Probation and Penitentiary 
Service.  Akhalaia is a controversial figure whose 
involvement in quelling prison riots in 2006 is questionable. 
 Who will head the new Ministry following his departure 
remains unclear. 
 
Legal
Aid Services 
 
6. (C)  Chkheidze told Emboff that the Legal Aid Service was 
previously subordinate to MOJ, but this subordination was due 
to inertia rather than a fully thought-out plan.  Beginning 
in 2011, the Legal Aid Service plans to provide services for 
indigent persons in civil and administrative cases. The Legal 
Aid Service is entrusted with the coordination of legal aid 
throughout the country, and its future subordination is the 
subject of active debate within the Legal Committee in 
Parliament.  The MOJ is currently preparing a draft law on 
the future subordination of the Legal Aid Services, due out 
in March 2009.   Emboffs attending the November 6 Legal 
Committee hearings noted that the meeting was chaired by the 
deputy chairman of the Committee, and the deputy minister of 
justice also helped lead the discussion.  Many NGOs that work 
on rule-of-law programs also participated in the discussion. 
Most NGOs seemed to agree that the Legal Aid Service should 
be a free-standing entity or attached in some way to the 
Ombudsman's Office.  The deputy chair and the deputy 
minister, however, advocated attaching it to the Penitentiary 
Department.  Most NGOs pointed out that the image of Legal 
Aid Services will be a poor one if attached to the department 
responsible for detention and imprisonment.  This arrangement 
would hardly support the notion of independence and equality. 
 In addition, the service would presumably be responsible for 
representing persons accused of crimes committed within the 
jails and prisons or while on probation, and there would 
therefore appear to be a clear conflict of interest. 
 
National Forensics Bureau (NFB) 
 
7.  (C)  Under the new law to take force January 1, 2009, the 
head of the NFB will be appointed by the president of Georgia 
and will be a separate entity.  This move is based on the 
recommendation of UN Special Rapporteur on Torture  Manfred 
Nowak.  Post has advocated since 2006 for an independent 
government institution with oversight by a board of directors 
comprised of participating ministries.  Past problems 
associated with the NFB have been a reluctance on the part of 
the MOIA to agree on sharing caseloads and issues stemming 
from the assignment of responsibilities for various forensics 
functions to one ministry. To date, the NFB has received more 
than 3 million U.S. dollars in U.S. technical assistance.  An 
efficient forensics bureau will be key in the collection and 
preservation of evidence linked to criminal investigations 
under the new Criminal Procedure Code.  Given the NFB's new 
status and receipt of significant USG assistance, it is hoped 
that the NFB will be empowered to play a more significant 
role in the criminal justice process. 
 
The Usual Suspects 
 
8.  (C)  Lia Mukhashvria, Human Rights Lawyer and former 
member of human rights organization Article 42, told Emboff 
that her take is that nothing is new, even with the proposed 
changes.  The same people are in the same positions (in 
particular Adeishvili), so combining these functions now does 
not make the process more transparent, even if it will 
streamline the bureaucracy.  For Mukhashvria, the major 
concern is that the chief prosecutor will not be accountable 
to anyone and cannot be called before Parliament.  Chkheidze, 
on the other hand, considers the merger part of a natural 
Qon the other hand, considers the merger part of a natural 
progression, envisioned in legislation from 2005 and 2007 and 
in approved action plans.  In principle, it could be very 
impressive.  Chkheidze cited Adeishvili's superb managerial 
skills as the key, which would have the ministry running like 
a top.  With regards to the soundness of the merger, 
Chkheidze pointed out to the Legal Committee that the 
justification of "that is the way it is in the U.S. and many 
European countries" was not sound reasoning alone and needed 
to be revisited. Ikali Kotetishvili, who works on the staff 
of the Prosecution Service, told Emboff that the decision was 
purely a political one.  The Venice Commission is also 
concerned with the merger.  According to Kotetishvili, three 
Georgian MPs will travel to Italy to discuss the merger in 
the wider context of judicial transparency. 
TEFFT

Wikileaks

08TBILISI2493, GEORGIA: SOCAR PURCHASES 22 OF GEORGIA’S INTERNAL

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
08TBILISI2493 2008-12-30 14:33 2011-08-30 01:44 CONFIDENTIAL Embassy Tbilisi

P 301433Z DEC 08
FM AMEMBASSY TBILISI
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 0639
INFO EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY ASHGABAT PRIORITY 
AMEMBASSY ASTANA PRIORITY

C O N F I D E N T I A L TBILISI 002493 
 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/28/2018 
TAGS: ENRG ECON PGOV PREL AZ GG
SUBJECT: GEORGIA: SOCAR PURCHASES 22 OF GEORGIA'S INTERNAL 
GAS DISTRIBUTION SYSTEMS 
 
REF: A) TBILISI 2190 B) TBILISI 2426 
 
Classified By: Ambassador John F. Tefft for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). 
 
1.  (C)  The Georgian Government has sold 22 regional natural 
gas distribution companies to the Azerbaijani State Oil and 
Gas Company SOCAR.  Georgia had originally pledged to sell a 
number of its natural gas delivery systems to SOCAR during 
negotiations with Azerbaijan in November that resulted in the 
conclusion of a five year MOU to provide gas to Georgia at 
existing rates (ref A).  While Government officials, 
including Minister of Energy Khetaguri and his Deputy 
Ministers, as well as now former First Deputy Minister of 
Economic Development Vato Lezhava worked hard to separate the 
MOU from the sale of the distribution system, the two were 
integrally tied. 
 
2.  (U) The sales agreement was signed on December 26 by 
Minister of Economic Development Lasha Zhvania and the 
Director General of SOCAR-Georgia Davit Zubitashvili.  SOCAR 
now owns regional distribution companies in Kakheti, 
Mtskheta-Mtianeti, Shida Kartli, Kvemo-Kartli, Adjara, Guria, 
Imereti and Samegrelo.  (Note:  The Tbilisi distribution 
system currently remains under the control of KazTransGas, 
which is owned by the Kazakh state-owned KazMunai Gas, though 
the company has said they are interested in selling the 
asset.  End note.)  As a stipulation to the sale, SOCAR must 
invest $40 million to further develop and upgrade gas 
distribution systems within three years.  As a result of 
expansion, SOCAR has also pledged to bring 150,000 new 
subscribers into the system. 
 
3.  (C)  Comment:  While the purchase price for the 22 
distribution systems has not been publicized, Georgian 
officials have hinted that it was lower than the original 10 
million USD asking price.  This was in large part due to the 
favorable terms Azerbaijan and SOCAR granted to Georgia in 
the overall five year MOU to supply gas to the country. 
SOCAR,s promise to invest heavily in the gas distribution 
network is crucial for Georgia, as the government does not 
have the money to do the necessary upgrades and expansions to 
serve the needs of the population.  While post has yet to 
receive information on exactly which distribution companies 
within the regions now belong to SOCAR, with the purchase of 
regional networks in Shida Kartli and Mtskheta it is possible 
that SOCAR will now be responsible, at least in part, for 
providing Tskhinvali and South Ossetia with gas.  This could 
prove to be a serious headache for the company and a possible 
pressure point for Azerbaijan with the Russians as the latter 
pushes to restore gas supplies to South Ossetia despite 
restricting access to repair infrastructure damaged during 
the August conflict (ref B).  End Comment. 
 
 
TEFFT

Wikileaks

08TBILISI2492, IMPACT OF CLOSING THE OSCE MISSION TO GEORGIA

WikiLeaks Link

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
08TBILISI2492 2008-12-30 14:28 2011-08-30 01:44 CONFIDENTIAL Embassy Tbilisi

VZCZCXRO7095
OO RUEHFL RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHNP RUEHROV RUEHSR
DE RUEHSI #2492/01 3651428
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 301428Z DEC 08
FM AMEMBASSY TBILISI
TO RUEHVEN/USMISSION USOSCE IMMEDIATE 2230
RUEHBS/USEU BRUSSELS IMMEDIATE
RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0636
INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING PRIORITY 0157
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY 4750
RUEHUNV/UNVIE VIENNA PRIORITY
RUEHNO/USMISSION USNATO PRIORITY 3984

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 TBILISI 002492 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/30/2018 
TAGS: PGOV PREL PHUM MOPS EAID ECON SNAR KBTS RU GG
SUBJECT: IMPACT OF CLOSING THE OSCE MISSION TO GEORGIA 
 
Classified By: Ambassador John F. Tefft for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). 
 
1. (C) Summary and comment.  The OSCE Mission to Georgia 
offers the international community several unique tools in 
monitoring and facilitating Georgia's democratic, secure and 
prosperous development.  As a monitoring mission, it provides 
information on the situation on the ground, with a special 
emphasis on security around South Ossetia; as a program 
implementer, it offers direct assistance in such important 
areas as human rights, economic development and law 
enforcement; as a policy adviser, it represents the 
collective wisdom of 56 member states.  The breadth of the 
organization's membership, combined with the breadth of the 
mission's activities, lends the OSCE's voice special force. 
Some of the OSCE's programs in Georgia are stronger than 
others, and the OSCE lost a significant portion of its 
value-added when it lost access to South Ossetia after the 
August war.  Even so, the military monitors, with their 
extensive experience and contacts, are an important resource 
even without that access; their loss could increase 
instability around South Ossetia.  The EU Monitoring Mission 
should eventually take up the slack, if it remains.  The OSCE 
has played a key role in facilitating Georgia's European 
integration, and some other mission will need to take up that 
role.  In general, other missions should be able to cover the 
major gaps left by the OSCE closure, but the process will 
take time.  The OSCE's frequent role as coordinator will be 
especially missed; the closure will complicate the 
international community's efforts to work together to assist 
Georgia and the region's peacefully and democratic 
development.  Perhaps most importantly, however, in the 
current atmosphere of high tension between Georgia and 
Russia, the loss of OSCE will remove an important mediating 
voice and possibly increase the likelihood of direct 
confrontation between the two.  Ultimately, with its access 
to South Ossetia blocked, preserving the OSCE's mission in 
Georgia is not worth sacrificing any fundamental U.S. 
principles -- but losing it will complicate our work in 
Georgia, and that of the international community, especially 
in the short term.  End summary and comment. 
 
THE MILITARY MONITORS 
 
2. (SBU) The highest-profile element of the OSCE in Georgia 
is the military monitoring mission, which has been in place 
since 1992.  Although the mission's mandate covers the entire 
country of Georgia, in practice it focuses on the situation 
around South Ossetia.  The personnel are true military 
monitors, with the appropriate background and focus.  Despite 
its small size -- 28 monitors, plus a supervisor -- the 
mission's extensive experience and contacts allow it not only 
to stay well informed, but also to deter destabilizing 
actions and promote dialogue.  The mission had an office in 
Tskhinvali until the August war; although it has not enjoyed 
regular access to South Ossetia since, it still maintains 
regular contacts, especially on the working level, with both 
Russian and Ossetian forces.  A Georgian police officer 
stationed just outside South Ossetia recently told an OSCE 
monitor he was worried about what would happen when the OSCE 
left.  The December 10 direct attack on an OSCE patrol's 
Qleft.  The December 10 direct attack on an OSCE patrol's 
vehicle could well demonstrate the threat some of the 
troublemakers perceive from the OSCE (see septel). 
 
3. (SBU) While monitoring the military situation, the OSCE 
mission also gather important information on other on the 
ground issues, such as the current status of internally 
displaced persons (IDPs).  The OSCE then shares that 
information with other interested parties, as well as uses it 
in the implementation of its own programs and its message to 
the government.  It can thereby maintain a regular focus on 
the immediate, medium- and long-term impact of the conflict 
and provide input into the search for solutions at all levels. 
 
4. (C) The only entity that can cover the loss of the OSCE 
military monitors is the recently established EU Monitoring 
Mission (EUMM), but post expects a considerable gap in 
coverage will be left.  The EUMM is larger than the OSCE, 
with around 100 monitors covering South Ossetia, and it has 
made impressive progress since its establishment in October 
2008.  Nevertheless, the office has not built up the 
institutional knowledge of the area that the OSCE has.  More 
importantly, it has not yet managed -- despite high-level 
efforts in Moscow and Geneva -- to est
ablish any reliable 
contacts with either the Russians or the Ossetians.  Post has 
found that, despite its smaller size, OSCE consistently 
obtains more information more quickly than the EUMM.  It is 
 
TBILISI 00002492  002 OF 003 
 
 
unclear whether the EUMM, in which Russia has no direct 
voice, will ever be able to develop the same level of 
ground-level cooperation with the Russians or the Ossetians. 
It is noteworthy that, although Russia at least acknowledged 
the OSCE's theoretical right to enter South Ossetia after the 
war (while doing nothing to facilitate actual entry), it has 
never recognized the EUMM's right to access.  In addition, 
while the U.S. has a direct vote in OSCE decisions in Vienna, 
we do not have similar authority to influence EUMM actions. 
 
5. (C) On an informal level, the OSCE has also been more 
directly helpful and cooperative with the USG.  Although post 
speaks daily with both the OSCE and the EUMM, the OSCE is 
consistently better informed and more responsive.  This 
difference can be explained to some extent by the OSCE's 
superior experience and contacts, but also by the EUMM's 
cumbersome bureaucratic structures.  Bilateral missions from 
EU members states in Tbilisi are not entitled to see written 
EUMM reports until they are cleared in Brussels, for example. 
 Some members of the EUMM have in fact suggested that the 
U.S. Embassy should not expect daily phone updates.  If the 
OSCE mission closes, the USG will likely need to work with 
the EUMM, and possibly the EU itself, to improve the flow of 
information.  It will also be necessary to ensure the EUMM 
itself remains; many observers expect Russia eventually to 
exert pressure to close it as well. 
 
DEMOCRACY BUILDING AND HUMAN RIGHTS PROTECTION 
 
6. (SBU) On human dimension issues, the OSCE fills a niche 
that no other single organizations may fit.  The voice of 56 
member states carries an authority on democratization and 
human rights protection that no single country, including the 
U.S., can hope to have.  Furthermore, the OSCE represents a 
wider range of perspectives than the EU, but is less unwieldy 
than either the EU or the UN.  Its Human Dimension Office 
therefore plays a key role in facilitating Georgia's European 
integration efforts by helping the government meet both OSCE 
and Council of Europe requirements.  In both of these 
processes, the OSCE office, which has greater resources than 
the EU's mission to Georgia, often acts as the key organizer 
and coordinator, providing staff, facilities and other 
resources.  As Georgia works toward European integration, the 
EU will probably have to increase its engagement, and 
possibly its presence on the ground, to make up for the loss 
of the OSCE. 
 
7. (SBU) The closure of the OSCE would not necessarily mean 
all its current roles would go unfilled.  Other organizations 
do engage in similar activities.  Individual EU missions, for 
example, or UNDP could carry out specific roles and functions 
the OSCE currently does.  Local and international NGOs, such 
as the International Republican Institute, National 
Democratic Institute, Georgian Young Lawyers Association, 
Penal Reform International, and Norwegian Rule of Law 
Advisors to Georgia could continue their efforts to support 
elections organization, trial monitoring, improvement of 
prison conditions, and other human rights programs.  Post 
typically consults the OSCE on human rights issues for its 
own reporting, so we would also likely have to rely more on 
contacts in these and other organizations. 
Qcontacts in these and other organizations. 
 
8. (SBU) Nevertheless, because of the breadth of its 
involvement, the closure of the OSCE mission will likely 
leave some significant gaps that will take time to fill.  On 
democracy and good governance issues, for example, the OSCE 
currently coordinates the Ambassadors Working Group, a forum 
for exchanging perspectives on election and democratic 
development among member nations in Georgia.  While another 
group could easily take on organization of such a group, it 
will take time.  Additional OSCE initiatives include: 
promoting political awareness, education, and involvement 
among Georgian academic and governmental circles; structural 
and political development assistance to Parliament (similar 
to our House Democracy Assistance Committee); technical 
support and facilitation for political parties, including 
opposition parties; election assistance to the government and 
its Central Election Commission; international monitoring of 
elections through ODIHR; and assisting Parliament with the 
reform of Georgia's Electoral Code. 
 
ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 
 
9. (SBU) The OSCE established the Economic Rehabilitation 
Program not only to develop the economy in and near South 
Ossetia, but also to build confidence and ultimately promote 
 
TBILISI 00002492  003 OF 003 
 
 
the peaceful resolution of the conflict.  With its unique 
access to both Government of Georgia and de facto officials 
and areas inside South Ossetia, the OSCE was well placed to 
pursue this kind of program; the EUMM and UNOMIG, as more 
narrowly defined monitoring missions, do not have the mandate 
to do so.  Since losing access to South Ossetia, the OSCE has 
proposed continuing the small business development program in 
the region of Shida Kartli south of South Ossetia.  The 
program is still worthwhile; the region is in great eed of 
economic development, and many of the beneficiaries are IDPs. 
 Furthermore, if the OSCE were to regain access to South 
Ossetia, it would once again be in a position to combine 
economic engagement with confidence building in a unique way. 
 If the OSCE fails to regain that access and unique role, 
however, it has no comparative advantage as an implementer of 
economic programs in the rest of Georgia. 
 
LAW ENFORCEMENT AND BORDER PROTECTION 
 
10. (SBU) The USG is by far the largest provider of 
assistance in these areas, but the OSCE is second, with all 
other donors sponsoring much smaller programs.  The OSCE 
therefore provides a useful, multilateral second perspective 
on the issues.  Like in the human dimension, this second 
perspective is especially useful as Georgia works toward 
European integration, because its law enforcement structures 
resemble European models more closely than U.S. ones.  Also, 
the OSCE's long history of working on law enforcement and 
border protection issues has allowed it to build considerable 
expertise in the areas.  Its staff have considerable capacity 
to provide targeted training and other programs locally; it 
is easier for them to find experts with the appropriate 
language skills, for example, than the USG.  In fact, if the 
mission closes, it might even be useful to explore using the 
OSCE or its staff as an implementer for USG programs, if at 
all possible. 
TEFFT

Wikileaks

08TBILISI2482, GEORGIA: ALASANIA SPEAKS BUT SAYS LITTLE

WikiLeaks Link

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Discussing cables
If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol).Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags #cablegate and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. #08TBILISI2482.
Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
08TBILISI2482 2008-12-30 10:29 2011-08-30 01:44 CONFIDENTIAL Embassy Tbilisi

VZCZCXRO6758
OO RUEHFL RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHNP RUEHROV RUEHSR
DE RUEHSI #2482/01 3651029
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 301029Z DEC 08
FM AMEMBASSY TBILISI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0628
INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 TBILISI 002482 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/25/2018 
TAGS: PGOV PREL GG
SUBJECT: GEORGIA: ALASANIA SPEAKS BUT SAYS LITTLE 
 
REF: TBILISI 2268 
 
Classified By: AMBASSADOR JOHN F. TEFFT.  REASONS:  1.4 (B) AND (D). 
 
1. (SBU)  Summary:  In his first public statement since his 
resignation, former Georgian Ambassador to the UN and newest 
opposition figure, Irakli Alasania, addressed the Georgian 
media on December 24th.  His long anticipated "announcement" 
consisted largely of common opposition criticisms of 
President Saakashvili.  Alasania largely avoided elaborating 
on concrete policy differences between himself and the 
Saakashvili government he is leaving, and also stayed away 
from discussing in detail his future political plans and 
alliances.  Alasania called for new elections; said he was 
consulting with various opposition figures but declined 
specifics; and blamed Saakashvili for not avoiding the August 
war.  Interestingly, Alasania was much more cautious in his 
private remarks to the Ambassador, acknowledging that Russia 
was not blameless in the August conflict and that we was 
carefully considering his options.  Alasania then quickly 
left for the United States to wrap up his affairs and is 
planning to return to Tbilisi in January.  End Summary. 
 
2.  (C)  Comment:  Alasania's much anticipated announcement 
was a bit underwhelming and quickly faded from news coverage. 
 Although Alasania has extensive international experience and 
a rising political future; the handling of his first public 
appearance and nature of his remarks indicate he is still a 
novice in the political arena.  His comments appear to be 
another iteration in the long history of new opposition 
figures delivering a familiar message hoping the problem has 
not been the message, but rather, the previous messengers. 
Alasania's remarks placed him firmly in the non-parliamentary 
opposition's rhetorical camp, though he was very careful not 
to tie himself to any particular opposition figure.  Alasania 
is still being courted by many; however, his options have not 
broadened since December.  Alasania's general popularity will 
only carry him so far, eventually the reality of being in the 
opposition will force him to decide whether to lead, follow, 
or get out of the way.  End Comment. 
 
LONG AWAITED PUBLIC ANNOUNCEMENT FAILS TO DELIVER 
 
3.  (C)  Alasania delivered vague comments about his 
political views and future intentions at a news conference in 
Tbilisi on December 24th.  Alasania explained that he decided 
to resign because of a "fundamental difference in views" with 
President Saakashvili.  His first public remarks since 
declaring himself opposition, did however place Alasania 
firmly in the court of the non-parlimamentary radical 
opposition.  The most notable moment was when Alasania 
sharply criticized Saakashvili, saying he fell into Russia's 
trap and accused the president of engaging Georgia in "this 
provocative war".  Overall, Alasania presented a fairly 
nuanced message on the war and its build up focusing mainly 
on the lack of interagency coordination and institutional 
policy apparatus to deal with developments in Abkhazia and 
South Ossetia but his criticism of Saakashvili dominated the 
headlines. 
 
4.  (C)  Alasania called for greater transparency, and a new 
focus on civil rights and fundamental freedoms.  Alasania 
also criticized the government for an absence of an economic 
strategy.  He used the press conference to lay out a laundry 
list of criticisms of the Government but did not discuss any 
major policy disagreements he has with the current 
administration.  Alasania repeated a call for new elections 
though did not specify whether he preferred Presidential or 
Parliamentary elections, only saying early elections "should 
QParliamentary elections, only saying early elections "should 
be held as soon as possible".  Alasania's packed press 
conference failed to generate any subsequent debate or press 
coverage other than a denouncement by Labor Party Leader 
Shalva Natelashvili who called Alasania part of an 
(unspecified) American project. 
 
WHILE RADICAL IN PUBLIC, FAR MORE CAUTIOUS IN PRIVATE 
 
5.  (C)  While Alasania expressed more critical views 
publicly, he adopted a more cautious tone in a private lunch 
with the P-4 Ambassadors.  In his public statements Alasania 
directly blamed Saakashvili for the war, something many 
Georgian see as playing into the Russians hands and expresses 
a view that does not necessarily square with public opinion. 
(Embassy Note: According to a new NDI poll conducted in 
November and reported septel, 47% of Georgian's polled think 
the war could have been avoided against 23% who said it could 
not have.  However, 59% said Russia started the war compared 
to 11% who feel Georgia did, and 43% rated Saakashvili's 
performance durig the war as good or very good versus 15% 
who said poor or very poor with 26% viewing his performance 
as adequate.  End Note)  However, in private he told the 
Ambassador the Russians were not blameless in the conflict - 
a message that would have much more resonance among the 
 
TBILISI 00002482  002 OF 002 
 
 
Georgian population, but that could be seen as supporting the 
current government.  Alasania's immediate calls for pre-term &#x000A
;elections also do not conform with public preferences. 
Recent polling (septel) has shown once again that the 
Georgian people do not want early elections. 
 
WHERE WILL HE LAND, NOBODY KNOWS 
 
6.  (C)  Alasania refused to engage questions on what 
cooperation he will have with various opposition figures. 
When asked if he planed to set up a separate political party, 
Alasania said there were already too many parties.  He said 
the most important issue is to consolidate all the "healthy 
political forces".  Again, Alasania would not elaborate on 
who the "healthy political forces" were but said he would 
cooperate with all the groups that share his view on the need 
to change the philosophy of the decision-making process. 
Asked specifically about Nino Burjanadze, Alasania repeated 
that he was having discussions with various parties adding 
that he respects her and will hold consultations with her as 
well. 
 
7.  (C)  Alasania spent most of his time in Tbilisi meeting 
with various opposition leaders and friends inside and 
outside the government.  After making the jump to the 
opposition, Alasania has been widely courted by opposition 
members under different terms and conditions.  Alasania 
appears reluctant to start his own party; remains still leery 
of taking up David Usupashvili and David Gamkrelidze's offer 
to lead their joint party; and is unwilling to be a number 
two to Nino Burjanadze or Zurab Noghaideli.  With snap 
pre-term elections doubtful making his chances to win 
elective office in the near term unlikely, Alasania might 
ultimately decide that waiting a year or two to see what 
unfolds politically before making any commitments is the best 
course of action. 
TEFFT

Wikileaks

08TBILISI2459, TBILISI: PATRIARCH’S TAKE ON MOSCOW MEETINGS,

WikiLeaks Link

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Discussing cables
If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol).Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags #cablegate and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. #08TBILISI2459.
Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
08TBILISI2459 2008-12-23 12:18 2011-08-30 01:44 CONFIDENTIAL Embassy Tbilisi

VZCZCXRO3426
OO RUEHFL RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHNP RUEHROV RUEHSR
DE RUEHSI #2459 3581218
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 231218Z DEC 08
FM AMEMBASSY TBILISI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0622
INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY

C O N F I D E N T I A L TBILISI 002459 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/25/2018 
TAGS: PGOV PHUM PREL GG
SUBJECT: TBILISI: PATRIARCH'S TAKE ON MOSCOW MEETINGS, 
ABKHASIA, ALEXEI II 
 
REF: TBILISI 2438 
 
Classified By: AMBASSADOR JOHN F. TEFFT.  REASONS:  1.4 (B) AND (D). 
 
1. (C)  Summary:  During a December 22 meeting with the 
Ambassador, Georgian Patriarch Ilia II discussed his recent 
meeting in Moscow with Russian President Medvedev the 
current situation in Abkhazia, and the likely successor of 
Patriarch Alexei II.  Ilia II expressed his desire to serve a 
positive role in normalizing and stabilizing relations with 
Russia though he firmly states that Georgia's territorial 
integrity will never be compromised.  He noted that Medvedev 
seemed open to the possibility of resuming normal bilateral 
relations with Georgia, but doubted that Medvedev is truly 
free to make these kinds of decisions.  Ilia II's comments 
regarding the Norashen Church dispute in Tbilisi reported 
reftel.  End Summary. 
 
Meeting the Medvedevs 
 
2.  (C)  Ilia II said his meeting with Medvedev was a very 
positive one.  The Patriarch sees his role as trying to bring 
relations between Russia and Georgia back to normal.  He 
praised Medvedev as intelligent and thoughtful.  Ilia II 
discussed the possibility of ethnic Georgian IDPs returning 
to the so-called "buffer zones" within undisputed Georgia and 
to the separatist regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. 
Ilia II said Medvedev supported their return and was open to 
compromise and working together to avert any humanitarian 
crisis.  Ilia II also discussed reopening the borders, 
resuming direct flights, and lifting the unilateral Russian 
trade embargo.  Medvedev appeared open to the possibility 
though Ilia II said he doubts Medvedev is truly free to make 
any such decisions.  According to Ilia II, his contacts in 
Moscow all tell him Medvedev has little power and that Putin 
is the sole decision maker.  Ilia II noted that he was seated 
next to Medvedev and his wife at a dinner in honor of Alexei 
II and appreciated the gesture.  He also very much 
appreciated Mrs. Medvedev's suggestion that they pray for all 
the victims of the conflict.  Ilia II said he told President 
Medvedev that Georgia's territorial integrity was 
non-negotiable, and Georgia could never be reconciled with 
the separation of Abkhazia and S. Ossetia from Georgia 
proper.  Medvedev said he understood, but suggested Abkhaz 
and South Ossetian opinions on the matter need to be included 
in any discussions. 
 
Abkhazia's Deal Looking Worse and Worse 
 
3.  (C)  Ilia II agreed with Ambassador's comment that the 
Abkhaz leadership might be feeling some remorse over its 
decision to put itself firmly under Russian domination.  The 
Patriarch (a former Metropolitan of Abkhazia) said he thinks 
the Abkhaz are finding out that "independence" is not what 
they had imagined it would be.  Ilia II expressed his concern 
that Russia will try to resettle Abkhazia with ethnic 
Russians to hasten a de-facto incorporation of the region 
into the Russian Federation.  Ilia II agreed with 
Ambassador's assessment that the Abkhaz had a choice to be an 
autonomous part of Georgia or wholly part of Russia, but 
added that if the Abkhaz leadership had/has no sense of that 
reality, little can be done. 
 
Next Russian Patriarch Will Be .... 
 
4.  (C)  Ilia II told the Ambassador it is very difficult to 
tell who will be the next Patriach of Russia.  He said he 
received a warm welcome in Russia despite speculation that he 
would not travel to Moscow due to the August war.  Ilia II 
said Metropolitan Kirill met him at the airport, and they had 
a brief, cordial conversation.  Ilia II described Kirill as a 
"stricter" personality than Alexei II.  He cautioned that 
Q"stricter" personality than Alexei II.  He cautioned that 
although Kirill is a likely successor to Alexei II, his 
accession to Patriarch of Russia is by no means assured. 
Ilia II expressed no special insights into the impending 
decision, but said that the Belorussian Metropolitan, 
Philaret, and Chancellor of the Moscow Patriarchate, Kliment, 
were names he had heard floated while in Moscow.  In any 
event, Ilia II hopes to continue constructive engagement with 
the Moscow Patriarchate, regardless of who is named to the 
post. 
TEFFT

Wikileaks

08TBILISI2458, GEORGIA: MILITARY MOVES FROM ABKHAZIA ON THE

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
08TBILISI2458 2008-12-23 12:18 2011-08-30 01:44 CONFIDENTIAL Embassy Tbilisi

VZCZCXRO3421
OO RUEHFL RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHNP RUEHROV RUEHSR
DE RUEHSI #2458/01 3581218
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 231218Z DEC 08
FM AMEMBASSY TBILISI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0619
INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING PRIORITY 0154
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY 4747
RUEHBS/USEU BRUSSELS PRIORITY
RUEHVEN/USMISSION USOSCE PRIORITY 2227

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 TBILISI 002458 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR EUR/CARC 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/22/218 
TAGS: PGOV PREL MOPS RU GG
SUBJECT: GEORGIA: MILITARY MOVES FROM ABKHAZIA ON THE 
HORIZON? 
 
REF: A. TBILISI 2271 
     B. HTTP://WWW.ABKHAZIAGOV.ORG/RU/PRESIDENT/PRESS /NEW- 
        S/DETAIL.PHP?ID=14295 
     C. TBILISI 2053 
     D. TBILISI 2413 
     E. HTTP://CONSILIUM.EUROPA.EU/UEDOCS/CMSUPLOAD/1 6110- 
        8%20RUSSIANS%20RETURN%20TO%20PEREVI.PDF 
 
Classified By: Ambassador John F. Tefft for Reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). 
 
1. (C)  Summary and comment.  The chilly winter air in 
Georgia is rife with rumors that the Abkhaz and Russians are 
planning military action in the near future, possibly to 
annex undisputed Georgian territory north of the Enguri River 
and establish the river as the "border."  Facts on the ground 
seem to lend these rumors credibility: de facto Abkhaz 
authorities have passed a law unilaterally redrawing the line 
along the river; UNOMIG and others have observed a 
substantial military buildup along the administrative 
boundary; and anecdotal evidence suggests something is afoot. 
 Post assesses that, if a decision were made by the Abkhaz 
and Russians to move on the areas around Ganmukhuri and 
Khurcha, they could establish control within about an hour, 
with the Georgians able to offer little resistance.  It would 
take only slightly longer to grab the triangle of land west 
of the Enguri Dam.  Although seizing the strategically 
important triangle is diplomatically riskier and therefore 
possibly less likely than a move on Ganmukhuri and Khurcha, 
the seizure of any territory would represent a real test for 
the U.S. and the international community.  Now is the time, 
before anything happens, to consider not only how we might 
react in the event, but also what we should do now to raise 
the cost to Abkhazia and Russia and reduce the likelihood of 
any moves.  End summary and comment. 
 
Preparations are underway 
 
2. (C) Georgian officials have been warning that the Abkhaz 
and Russians have their eyes on the pieces of undisputed 
Georgian territory north of the Enguri (ref A).  A quick look 
at the map shows the attraction.  Making the river the line 
of demarcation would offer clear strategic advantages in 
terms of maintaining control of the boundary.  Controlling 
the area west of the dam would furthermore give the Abkhaz 
and Russians the ability to control the dam, and therefore 
both elements of the Enguri hydroelectric production system. 
In recent weeks, the chatter in the press and elsewhere about 
such an intention on the part of the Abkhaz and Russians has 
increased, especially with regard to Ganmukhuri and Khurcha. 
 
3. (C) Changing facts on the ground indicate such chatter is 
not unfounded.  On October 26 the Abkhaz "Parliament" 
announced it had adopted a measure to define the southern 
"border" of Abkhazia as the Enguri River itself, beginning as 
far east as the Nenskra River (ref B).  This would include 
the areas around Ganmukhuri, Khurcha, and the triangle west 
of the Enguri Dam.  This legislative act seems to lay the 
groundwork for a more forceful assertion of that boundary at 
some point in the future. 
 
4. (C) Steps to prepare for such a move seem to be proceeding 
apace.  Along with an ongoing expansion of Abkhaz and Russian 
fortifications along the existing boundary (ref C), there has 
been a significant uptick in the movement of military 
hardware in recent weeks.  The EU Monitoring Mission (EUMM) 
has heard from locals there are now 100 Abkhaz or Russian 
tanks in the Gali region, and has itself seen evidence of 
Qtanks in the Gali region, and has itself seen evidence of 
tanks across the boundary.  The Georgian press reported 55 
tanks moving into Gali District on December 11 and a military 
unit in Gagida, just north of Ganmukhuri.  Russian units have 
reportedly been deployed in Pichori (north of Ganmukhuri), 
Sida (north of Khurcha), and Chuburkhinji (just east of Sida) 
-- all villages close to the boundary.  The press also 
reported that Russian forces have been deployed in the 
heights of Gali District that allow observation and 
potentially shelling into Zugdidi District. 
 
5. (C) Over the last month or so, UNOMIG has seen its freedom 
of movement greatly limited.  It can now count on access only 
to a narrow corridor along the M-27; any movements beyond 
that corridor depend on the mood of local Abkhaz forces. 
UNOMIG can rarely gain access to the area close to the 
boundary.  On December 12, for example, locals told UNOMIG 
that 12-14 tanks had moved toward Nabakevi (inside Abkhazia, 
just across the administrative boundary from Khurcha), and 
that the road they took was then closed for civilian use.  A 
 
TBILISI 00002458  002 OF 003 
 
 
patrol tried to verify the information by approaching the 
location from another direction, but was prevented from 
proceeding by a Rus
sian road block.  Despite these 
limitations on its patrols, UNOMIG has been able to confirm 
significant military movements and equipment in recent weeks. 
 On December 11, for example, a patrol directly observed a 
convoy on the M-27 heading south, consisting of 10 T-72 tanks 
equipped with reactive armor, 6 self-propelled howitzers, 2 
armored personnel carriers with turret and machine guns 
mounted, and other vehicles; the convoy was eventually 
observed turning off the highway toward Salkhino village 
(inside Abkhazia between Gali and Zugdidi).  UNOMIG also 
confirmed the presence of unidentified vessels off the coast 
of Ganmukhuri on December 7 and 20, one of which seemed to 
resemble a Grisha-class frigate. 
 
What would Georgia do? 
 
6. (C) Based on the apparent strength and location of Abkhaz 
and Russian forces in the area, post assesses that, once a 
dcision is made to take the areas around Ganmukhuri and 
Khurcha, the Abkhaz and Russians could do so in about an 
hour.  The triangle of land west of the Enguri Dam would not 
take much longer to seize.  The Georgian Interior Ministry 
has reinforced its positions along the boundary; UNOMIG 
reported on December 18, for example, an increase in the 
number and staffing of Georgian posts in the Ganmukhuri area. 
 The EUMM reported December 22 that the Georgian 24th tank 
battalion, consisting of 26 T-72s, recently moved to Senaki 
Base; the EUMM speculated that this move was in response to 
recent moves in Abkhazia.  Nevertheless, considering the 
tactical difficulty of defending territory on the far side of 
the river and the larger military risks of renewing 
engagement with the Abkhaz and Russians, it is unlikely that 
the Georgians would be able to put up much resistance to a 
determined movement to take the areas near Ganmukhuri, 
Khurcha, and the triangle west of the dam. 
 
What will the Abkhaz and Russians do? 
 
7. (C) Post has heard many predictions that the Abkhaz and 
Russians will move at some point.  A half-Abkhaz, 
half-Georgian employee of a western NGO based in Gali, for 
example, recently told EmbOff that a Russian military 
commander told her additional military action was coming this 
spring.  Some observers expect action against Ganmukhuri and 
Khurcha within three months.  Although the value of these 
predictions vary, it is possible to consider issues the 
Abkhaz and Russians will analyze when making their decision. 
The strategic interest for the Abkhaz and Russians in both 
occupying additional territory and establishing a more 
naturally defensible "border" is clear.  The military risk 
also seems to be fairly low. 
 
8. (C) The primary question for them is therefore whether the 
benefits are worth the potential diplomatic costs.  In making 
this determination, the Abkhaz and Russians will no doubt 
look to the example of Perevi (ref D).  In this case, Russian 
forces established control over a village clearly outside the 
administrative boundary of South Ossetia; in fact, they 
implicitly recognized its location when they withdrew their 
forces on December 11.  When they decided they needed to 
maintain control, however, they reintroduced their forces on 
December 13, and the Georgian side withdrew.  Although some 
international observers, such as the EUMM, promptly condemned 
Qinternational observers, such as the EUMM, promptly condemned 
the Russians' reentry (ref E), the Russian side apparently 
made the determination that controlling the area -- which has 
far less strategic significance than the areas north of the 
Enguri -- was well worth the censure.  That censure was not 
unanimous or overwhelming, however.  On December 22, EmbOffs 
in fact heard from the EUMM that even its statement was 
itself internally criticized by EU Special Envoy Pierre 
Morel, who apparently feared it would upset the Russians on 
the eve of the third round of Geneva talks. 
 
9. (C) Because the Enguri Power Station generates 40 percent 
of Georgia's electricity in the winter, the international 
community would likely react quite strongly to any move on 
the triangle west of the Enguri Dam.  Some observers 
therefore suggest that the Abkhaz and Russians will move on 
Ganmukhuri and Khurcha, not the triangle, and observe the 
reaction. 
 
What will we do? 
 
10. (C) Considering the changed situation on the ground and 
 
TBILISI 00002458  003 OF 003 
 
 
the various incentives and disincentives, post considers it 
quite possible that Abkhazia and Russia will move at some 
point in the future to annex the territories north of the 
Enguri.  This is therefore the time to consider a response if 
such a scenario plays out -- and what steps we might take to 
ward off such a move.  The international community was able 
to work together to stop the fighting on August 12, but it 
has not yet successfully enforced the terms of that 
cease-fire.  The situation in Perevi suggests that Russia has 
calculated that the international community will tolerate 
even further violations, at least around the edges of the 
current situation.  Unless we clearly articulate the damage 
further incursions will do to Russia's international 
standing, it may well decide an improved boundary for 
Abkhazia is worth a bit of scolding.  It may eventually 
decide that controlling 40 percent of Georgia's winter 
electricity -- and all of Abkhazia's -- is worth some 
diplomatic pain as well.  A stronger response to the 
situation in Perevi might send a different signal on the 
costs of ignoring existing boundaries.  A rejuvenated UNOMIG 
might be better able to monitor and deter military action. 
An EUMM with access into Abkhazia might do the same.  All of 
these steps will be difficult, requiring concerted efforts by 
a coordinated international community -- but they would be 
easier than determining an appropriate response to annexation 
after the fact. 
TEFFT

Wikileaks

08TBILISI2440, GEORGIA: 2008 COUNTRY REPORTS ON TERRORISM

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
08TBILISI2440 2008-12-23 05:17 2011-08-30 01:44 UNCLASSIFIED Embassy Tbilisi

VZCZCXYZ0009
RR RUEHWEB

DE RUEHSI #2440 3580517
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 230517Z DEC 08
FM AMEMBASSY TBILISI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 0615
INFO RUEILB/NCTC WASHINGTON DC

UNCLAS TBILISI 002440 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR S/CT: RHONDA SHORE AND NCTC 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PTER ACEC
SUBJECT: GEORGIA: 2008 COUNTRY REPORTS ON TERRORISM 
 
REF: STATE 120019 
 
1.  (U)  BEGIN TEXT. 
Georgia has granted blanket over flight clearance to all U.S. 
military aircraft engaged in operations in Afghanistan and Iraq. 
Georgia contributed over 2,000 troops to counterterrorism efforts in 
Iraq and became a contributing nation to the International Security 
Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan.   However, Georgia withdrew 
its troops from Iraq during the August war with Russia to provide 
for homeland defense. 
The Georgian government continues to improve border security 
operations and worked to eliminate corruption at border checkpoints, 
focusing its efforts on stopping the smuggling of contraband, 
including money, illegal drugs, and all types of weapons (chemical, 
nuclear and biological) that could support terrorism. Therewere 
significant improvements in infrastructure at the major border 
crossing checkpoints: through DOE's Second Line of Defense Program 
(SLD) a border crossing at Tsodna/Lagodekhi (on the border with 
Azerbaijan) was completed.   Seven remote border posts are in the 
final stages of completion which will limit illegal crossings on the 
Azeri-Georgian border.  In 2008, sixty-one portal monitors have been 
or are being installed at various sites throughout the country to 
detect radioactive material and devices.  At 15 border checkpoints, 
Passive Infrared Sensors have been installed.  The SLD program has 
trained individuals in the Georgian Border Police, Customs, and the 
Institute of Physics, enhancing the Government of Georgia's 
radioactive material detection capabilities.  The Department of 
Justice conducted a bulk cash smuggling seminar with the Office of 
Prosecutor General, Border Police, Ministry of Interior, and 
Customs. 
Border crossings into Russia from the separatist regions of Abkhazia 
and South Ossetia continue, but were not under the control of the 
Government of Georgia. This situation allowed for the unrestricted 
and unidentified flow of people, goods, and other items from Russia 
into these regions.  Since the August 2008 conflict, the 
Administrative Boundary Lines between Georgia and the conflict 
regions are heavily militarized and movements across the boundary 
are controlled, although no formal customs checks or procedures 
exist. 
 
END TEXT. 
 
TEFFT

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08TBILISI2439, GEORGIAN PARLIAMENT ENDORSES INVESTIGATORY

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
08TBILISI2439 2008-12-22 14:35 2011-08-30 01:44 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Tbilisi

VZCZCXRO2421
PP RUEHAG RUEHAST RUEHDA RUEHDF RUEHFL RUEHIK RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHLN
RUEHLZ RUEHNP RUEHPOD RUEHROV RUEHSK RUEHSR RUEHVK RUEHYG
DE RUEHSI #2439/01 3571435
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 221435Z DEC 08
FM AMEMBASSY TBILISI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 0613
INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 TBILISI 002439 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR EUR/CARC 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PGOV PREL PHUM RU GG
SUBJECT: GEORGIAN PARLIAMENT ENDORSES INVESTIGATORY 
COMMITTEE REPORT, NOT ALL AGREE 
 
REF: A. TBILISI 2420 
     B. TBILISI 2399 
 
1. (SBU) Summary: In a unanimous vote of 88 to none on 
December 19, Georgia's Parliament formally endorsed the 
report and conclusion presented by the ad-hoc Committee to 
Investigate August Events (ref A).  Parliamentary Speaker 
David Bakradze spoke highly of the Committee's work. 
Opposition Vice-Speaker Levan Vepkhvadze publicly expressed 
hope that the government would implement the report's 12 
recommendations, as well as dismay that former Foreign 
Minister Eka Tkeshelashvili was appointed Secretary of the 
NSC.  Some government officials disagreed with the 
Committee's criticism of their actions.  One MP, Jondi 
Baghaturia, criticized the committee for its 
"contradictions."  Non-parliamentary opposition figures 
continue to disparage the Committee's work as "biased and 
untruthful."  The Committee's report has already borne fruit, 
as Committee member MP Dimitry Lortkipanidze plans to 
introduce a new law covering Georgia's civil defense in 
Spring 2009.  Given the report's reasonable conclusions, the 
onus is now on the government to address its recommendations. 
 End Summary. 
 
PARLIAMENT, SPEAKER ENDORSE REPORT 
 
2. (U) On December 19, Georgia's Parliament adopted the 
conclusions of the ad-hoc Committee Investigating August 
Events (ref A).  The vote was unanimous, with 88 in favor and 
none opposed.  Both government and opposition MPs present 
voted in favor.  (Note: Parliament has 138 members; te 
outstanding 50 were not present for the vote.  End note.) 
Speaker Bakradze praised the Committee's work and said the 
government was committed to follow the report's 
recommendations.  Foreign Minister Grigol Vashadze echoed 
Bakradze's statement. 
 
OPPOSITION CALL FOR IMPLEMENTATION 
 
3. (U) Opposition Vice-Speaker, and Committee member, Levan 
Vepkhvadze (of the Christian-Democratic Movement) said he 
hopes the executive branch of government will accept and 
implement the Committee's recommendations as guidelines in 
its future work.  At the same time, Vepkhvadze said he was 
dissatisfied that former FM Eka Tkeshelashvili was appointed 
Secretary of the NSC, because her performance during the war 
was criticized in the Committee report. 
 
EXECUTIVES DISAGREE WITH CRITICISM 
 
4. (U) Executive branch officials, including Minister of 
Energy Alexandre Khetaguri and head of the Abkhaz 
government-in-exile Malkhaz Akishbaia both disagreed with the 
Committee's criticism of their performances.  Khetaguri 
claimed that there were no disruptions in energy supplies 
during the war.  Akishbaia stressed that due to safety 
reasons, he could not have physically gone to the Kodori 
Gorge during the invasion. 
 
SOME OPPOSITION CRITICIZE REPORT AND COMMITTEE 
 
5. (SBU) Lone wolf opposition MP Jondi Baghaturia strongly 
criticized the committee, saying its report is untrustworthy 
since "it contradicts itself on many issues."  Baghaturia 
argued the Committee "did not study who was responsible for 
the weak performance of the rear, said nothing on the 
non-targeted expenditure of Defense funds, and ignored the 
fact that during the war soldiers abandoned by their 
commanders had nothing to eat but unripe fruit for 3-4 days." 
 (Note: Baghaturia was formally a member of the Committee, 
but refused to participate.  End note.) Non-parliamentary 
opposition politicians have disparaged the Committee and its 
work since inception.  Most claim the Committee was designed 
to "whitewash" the government's failure in the war.  New 
Rightist Mamuka Katsitadze and Conservative Kakha Kukava 
(both former MPs who refused to take their seats in 
Q(both former MPs who refused to take their seats in 
Parliament in June) said the Committee was biased in its 
investigation and untruthful in its conclusions. 
 
NEXT STEPS 
 
6. (U) Opposition MP and Committee member Dimitry 
Lortkipanidze (formerly of the United Opposition) was the 
first to act on the Committee's report.  He announced that he 
plans to introduce a draft law on Georgia's Civil Defense in 
Parliament's 2009 spring session.  Lortkipanidze claimed the 
report's conclusions showed the weakness of civil defense in 
Georgia, and the need for a separate structure (to manage 
evacuations, shelter displaced persons, etc.)  Committee 
 
TBILISI 00002439  002 OF 002 
 
 
Chairman Paata Davitaia said he supports Lortkipanidze's 
initiative. 
 
COMMENT 
 
7. (SBU) Public reaction to the report has been varied and 
watchful; interest remains high.  Generally, public sentiment 
seems to mirror that of the politicians, with most supporting 
the Committee's integrity and work.  We believe that the 
report draws two justifiable conclusions: the events of 
August were the result of multiple actions that w
ere 
initiated much earlier and exploited militarily by Russia; 
and the Georgian government must now correct their systemic 
and personnel failures exposed by Russia's invasion.  Two 
clear examples of needed action include Lortkipanidze's law 
on Civil Defense, and the Christian-Democratic Movement's 
proposal for a new NSC structure (ref B).  The onus is now on 
the government to address and implement the Committee's 
recommendations, now and into the future.  End Comment. 
TEFFT

Wikileaks