09TBILISI121, GEORGIA: FOLLOW ON QUESTIONS ON REMOVAL OF SUKHUMI

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
09TBILISI121 2009-01-23 13:21 2011-08-30 01:44 CONFIDENTIAL Embassy Tbilisi

VZCZCXYZ0000
PP RUEHWEB

DE RUEHSI #0121 0231321
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 231321Z JAN 09
FM AMEMBASSY TBILISI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 0821
INFO RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW PRIORITY 8221
RUEHUNV/UNVIE VIENNA PRIORITY

C O N F I D E N T I A L TBILISI 000121 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPARTMENT FOR ISN/WMDT, EUR/PRA, EUR/RUS, AND EUR/CARC 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/23/2019 
TAGS: KNNP PARM PGOV PREL RS GG
SUBJECT: GEORGIA: FOLLOW ON QUESTIONS ON REMOVAL OF SUKHUMI 
RADIOACTIVE SOURCES 
 
REF: A. 09 STATE 3902 
     B. 08 STATE 126999 
     C. 08 MOSCOW 3605 
     D. 08 TBILISI 2172 
 
Classified By: AMBASSADOR JOHN F. TEFFT FOR REASONS 1.4 B and D. 
 
1. (U) This is an action request.  Post requests Department's 
assistance in providing responses to the questions in 
paragraph 3.  End action request. 
 
2. (C) Poloffs delivered ref A demarche to Giorgi Dolidze, 
MFA's Deputy Director of the Security Policy and 
Euro-Atlantic Integration Department, and Nestan 
Bejanishvili, Third Secretary of the same department. 
Dolidze thanked poloffs for the information and stated that 
if the high-level radioactive sources no longer exist in 
Abkhazia, then we have reached our common goal of removing 
this threat from Georgia.  He said he would speak with his 
leadership after the meeting and forward any reactions. 
 
3. (C) Dolidze did express some concern regarding the Russian 
response and asked the following three questions.  (1) What 
guarantees did the Russians provide that they had removed the 
high-level radioactive sources?  He stated that the Georgians 
do not want to be in the position one day of discovering 
these sources in a smuggling case.  (2) Did the Russians 
formally inform the IAEA that they had removed these sources? 
 (3) Did the Russians remove all the radioactive sources from 
the Sukhumi Institute of Physics and the Sukhumi Institute 
for Experimental Pathology or only the four high-level 
radioactive sources? 
 
4. (U) Post appreciates the Department's assistance in 
answering the Georgian questions above. 
TEFFT

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