08TBILISI1265, LISTS OF SANCTIONED ENTITIES DELIVERED TO

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Reference ID	Created	Released	Classification	Origin
08TBILISI1265	2008-07-23 12:21	2011-08-30 01:44	UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY	Embassy Tbilisi


VZCZCXRO4153
PP RUEHAG RUEHAST RUEHDA RUEHDF RUEHFL RUEHIK RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHLN
RUEHLZ RUEHPOD RUEHROV RUEHSR RUEHVK RUEHYG
DE RUEHSI #1265 2051221
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 231221Z JUL 08
FM AMEMBASSY TBILISI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 9799
INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE


UNCLAS TBILISI 001265 
 
SIPDIS 
SENSITIVE 
 
DEPT FOR EUR/CARC 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PGOV PHUM PREL GG KDEM
SUBJECT: LISTS OF SANCTIONED ENTITIES DELIVERED TO 
GOVERNMENT 
 
REF: A. STATE 61363 
     ¶B. STATE 62052 
     ¶C. STATE 65133 
     ¶D. STATE 65511 
     ¶E. STATE 68510 
 
¶1. (SBU) Summary: Poloffs visited the new headquarters of the 
Financial Monitoring Service (FMS) and the Financial 
Supervisory Agency (FSA) and delivered reftel lists of 
sanctioned organizations to Giorgi Kadagidze of FSA. Poloffs 
learned little about money laundering in Abkhazia because 
neither service has a grasp or insight into the complexities 
of Abkhaz banking.  The FMS attributes many of the problems 
to Russian banks illegally operating in Abkhazia despite the 
Russian's outright denial of their presence.  The Financial 
Action Task Force (FATF) addresses money laundering 
internationally but Russia is a member of this organization 
and according to FMS, prevents any progress in invesigating 
money laundering in Abkhazia. In 2007, FMS identified 17 
money laundering cases in Georgia.  Related properties were 
confiscated and arrests were made. In 2008, four cases have 
been reported.  End Summary. 
 
¶2. (SBU) Poloffs visited the new site of Georgia's Financial 
Monitoring Service (FMS) and the Financial Supervisory Agency 
(FSA).  Both offices have been relocated to jailed mafia 
member Shakro Kalashov's newly constructed and recently 
confiscated mansion in the hills of Tskhneti overlooking 
Tbilisi.  Kalashov is currently serving a twelve year 
sentence in Spain and has an eighteen year sentence in 
Georgia pending his return. 
 
¶3. (SBU) According to Kadagidze, head of the FSA, the FSA is 
the financial regulator responsible for disseminating 
information and oversight of the financial markets.  FMS is 
Georgia's financial intelligence unit and responsible for 
monitoring terrorist fiances. As requested by the reftels, 
Poloffs delivered demarches and the agencies will update 
their databases and disseminate the information to the 
designated people. 
 
¶4. (SBU) Poloffs asked FMS if they are able to provide any 
information on money laundering in Abkhazia. FMS conveyed to 
Poloffs that they have no mechanism to monitor money 
laundering in Abkhazia or South Ossetia.  Georgia has the 
backing of Moneyval - an international oversight mechanism - 
that has excused Georgia from obligations to influence these 
regions because they are beyond Georgia's control. FMS told 
Poloffs they have sent letters to Russia regarding Russian 
banks' involvement with Abkhaz banks.  Russia officially 
denies their involvement in Abkhazia. FMS told Poloffs that 
they do not maintain contact with Abkhazia because they do 
not want to officially recognize the Abkhaz de-facto 
government presence. There is one bank in the Georgian 
controlled Kodori Gorge that distributes pensions.  There are 
no banks in Gali at all. 
TEFFT

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