Monthly Archives: July 2007

07TBILISI1639, USG TO HOST THE WASHINGTON INTERNATIONAL RENEWABLE

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
07TBILISI1639 2007-07-11 11:54 2011-08-30 01:44 UNCLASSIFIED Embassy Tbilisi

VZCZCXYZ0016
RR RUEHWEB

DE RUEHSI #1639 1921154
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 111154Z JUL 07
FM AMEMBASSY TBILISI
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 6967

UNCLAS TBILISI 001639 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: SENV SOCI EAID EPET TRGY KPAO GG
SUBJECT: USG TO HOST THE WASHINGTON INTERNATIONAL RENEWABLE 
ENERGY CONFERENCE 2008 (WIREC 2008) 
 
REF: SECSTATE 80334 
 
1. Per reftel, Ambassador sent information about the 
conference by letter to Minister of Energy Gilauri and 
Minister of Environmental Protection and Natural Resources 
Tkeshelashvili. As requested, we will look for other 
opportunities to highlight WIREC 2008 with host country 
media, civil society, and the private sector. 
TEFFT

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07TBILISI1624, GEORGIA-CHINA: TRADE AND ECONOMIC RELATIONS

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
07TBILISI1624 2007-07-10 07:09 2011-08-30 01:44 CONFIDENTIAL Embassy Tbilisi

VZCZCXRO7712
PP RUEHDBU RUEHFL RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHROV RUEHSR
DE RUEHSI #1624/01 1910709
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 100709Z JUL 07
FM AMEMBASSY TBILISI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 6948
INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUCPDOC/DEPT OF COMMERCE WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEAWJA/DEPT OF JUSTICE WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEATRS/DEPT OF TREASURY WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEHLMC/MILLENNIUM CHALLENGE CORPORATION PRIORITY

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 TBILISI 001624 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DOC FOR DANICA STARKS, EUR/CACEN, INR/B 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/26/2027 
TAGS: EFIN ETRD PREL GG
SUBJECT: GEORGIA-CHINA: TRADE AND ECONOMIC RELATIONS 
 
 
TBILISI 00001624  001.2 OF 003 
 
 
Classified By: Ambassador John F. Tefft for reasons 1.5 (b) and (d). 
 
1. (C) Summary.  On June 28, press reports announced that 
Chinese buyers purchased Tbilisi's central supermarket.  The 
news sparked mild protests by some Georgians who feel 
threatened by increasing Chinese immigration and investment 
in Georgia, which is a natural outgrowth of Georgia's efforts 
to increase foreign direct investment (FDI) to develop the 
economy.  China and Georgia have bilateral economic 
agreements dating back to 1993.  Chinese FDI totaled USD 51 
million from 2002 to 2006, and investors are in diverse 
sectors such as energy, transportation, logging, and retail. 
The number of Chinese immigrants living in Georgia is 
unclear, but estimates range from the over 300 officially 
registered residents to unconfirmed press reports of 10,000. 
Current trends suggest Chinese immigrants will continue to 
come and stay as long as there is money to be made.  End 
Summary. 
 
Bilateral relations and FDI 
--------------------------- 
 
2. (U) China and Georgia have bilateral economic agreements 
dating back to 1993.  They touch on cooperation in technical 
and economic matters, trade, tourism, visa regimes, maritime, 
double taxation avoidance, and construction.  China has given 
several grants and credits totaling over USD 9 million to 
Georgia since its independence.  These helped establish the 
Georgian Embassy in China in 2004 (USD 600,000), forgave 
Georgia's debt to China in 2005 (USD 2.4 million), equipped 
Georgia's Finance Ministry in 2006 (USD 2.5 million), and 
provided a 20-year interest free credit in 2001 (USD 3.7 
million).  Today, GoG officials are courting Chinese 
investment, as evidenced by Minister of Economic Development 
Giorgi Arveladze's visit to Beijing in late 2006 for the 
China-Georgia business forum.  Chinese FDI in Georgia totaled 
USD 51 million from 2002 to 2006, representing 1.4 percent of 
overall FDI and ranking 16th behind the U.S., U.K., Turkey, 
Azerbaijan, Russia, Kazakhstan, and others.  Total trade - 
113.7 million in 2006 - grew 117 percent from 2005.  Imports 
increased 121 percent.  Copper and ferroalloy scrap made up 
97 percent (USD 9.7 million) of 2006 exports to China, with 
wine coming in second at 2.3 percent (USD 200,000). 
 
Energy interests 
---------------- 
 
3. (C) In 2003, Chinese invested nearly USD 20 million into 
the Khadori Power Plant, near the Pankisi Gorge, constructed 
that year.  Liu Hiaohui and You Yimou, Chinese Embassy 
officials, told Econoff the plant was built by a Chinese 
enterprise with credit from the Chinese export-import bank, 
and represents the largest single project in Georgia for the 
Chinese.  The Chinese Embassy officials said other Chinese 
companies are poised to invest in Georgia, but only if the 
Khadori plant becomes a success.  According to Liu, former 
President Shevardnadze's administration promised to buy all 
the electricity produced by the plants and maintain a tariff 
to customers of 4.66 cents per KW.  Now, however, the tariff 
is less than 4 cents per KW, and the project likely won't be 
financially viable.  Both Liu and You emphasized the GoG 
should "give good treatment to the project and make it 
profitable."  According to Steve Yu, a Chinese community 
leader, the Chinese chose the wrong place to build a hydro 
station, saying winter has no rain and summer brings floods. 
Further, the current government is allowing the market to set 
the price for electricity.  Despite the concerns of Liu and 
You, however, interested Chinese investors are not deterred 
by the apparent lack of success in the power plant. 
 
Transportation and logging 
-------------------------- 
 
4. (C) More recent investments are in the transporation and 
logging industries.  In early June, the Georgian Railway 
signed a USD 16 million agreement with a Chinese-Georgian 
joint venture ElektroVagonShemketebeli (Electric Carriage 
Repair Plant) to purchase trains for the first time in 33 
years.  The Chinese side will supply the train interiors. 
Other Chinese investors are looking beyond the interior 
design of train cars.  Upcoming changes to the Law on 
Privatization will allow privatization of the state railroad 
company, previously marked as a strategic security asset, and 
according to press reports the GoG has had discussion with 
the Chinese.  Other interests are in logging.  In May a 
Chinese-Georgian joint venture - Wood and Industrial 
Development Ltd - paid USD 1.73 million in a controversial 
 
TBILISI 00001624  002.4 OF 003 
 
 
auction of logging rights to cut 31,000 cubic meters per year 
in the Tsalenjikha and Chkhorotsku forest districts in the 
Samegrelo region.  Opponents to the long-term lease contend 
the GoG should have done a full inventory of its forest 
assets before leasing them.  The GoG cla
ims the license 
requires the investors to finish the inventory.  The license 
also requires a 90 percent local workforce.  The joint 
venture likely will supply a nearby Chinese-Georgian sawmill, 
which currently employs 100 local workers. 
 
Retail 
------ 
 
5. (U) Chinese shops are popping up all over Georgia, 
including in Zugdidi near Abkhazia.  In May, Chinese and 
Japanese investors purchased the central market of Gali in 
Abkhazia for USD 150,000 paid to the de facto authorities; 
Moscow Mayor Yuri Luzhkov originally introduced the investors 
to the region.  The press reported the investors will pay USD 
50,000 to the Abkhaz separatist regime and pay an annual fee 
of 8 percent of the market's profit.  Chinese investors also 
plan to build a department store in Sukhumi.  Press reports 
on June 28 announced that Chinese buyers purchased Tbilisi's 
central supermarket.  The announcements sparked mild protests 
by some Georgians, including opposition groups, who feel 
threatened by increasing Chinese investment and immigration 
in Georgia. 
 
The accidental immigrant 
------------------------ 
 
6. (C) One of the first Chinese immigrants, Steve Yu, came to 
Georgia eight years ago from China on a short-term business 
trip to help a friend in the timber industry.  Having no 
plans to stay, he returned to his home in China.  Within a 
short time, however, he lost his job in China and returned to 
Georgia.  He opened two Chinese restaurants, and later 
started a pig farm in Mskheta.  Now he has a Georgian wife, 
has made a name for himself, and is the "godfather" of sorts 
among the local Chinese merchants.  He runs the Chinese 
Commodity Center, opened in fall 2006, across from the main 
Tbilisi supermarket.  Chinese merchants throughout Georgia 
purchase Chinese goods at wholesale in the market, which is a 
collection of 50 shops.  Chinese wholesalers procure products 
in China and ship them in containers to Poti port, which 
takes 30-35 days.  Yu says Georgia is attractive because 
merchants can charge double for goods in China.  However, Yu 
said Georgian customs poses the biggest hurdle, but only for 
Chinese merchants.  As an example, he said there might be two 
identical containers with identical products.  The 
Chinese-owned container will be valued twice the value of the 
Georgian-owned container.  Yu estimates that one family-owned 
shop can sell two shipping containers of products in one 
year.  He estimates that about 300 containers destined for 
Chinese shops, worth approximately USD 50,000 each, enter 
Georgia annually for a total of USD 15 million in products. 
Yu said there are between 100 and 150 small Chinese-owned 
shops throughout Georgia, with about 60 in Tbilisi alone. 
 
7. (C) Official immigration statistics are unavailable. 
However, the Civil Registration Agency in the Ministry of 
Justice has records of 199 Chinese who registered in 2006 - 
the first year such registration was available - as temporary 
residents.  In the first quarter 2007, 119 registered.  These 
numbers represent the lower bound for estimating the number 
of Chinese immigrants, but do show a marked increase in the 
rate of registration.  The true number is higher. 
Unconfirmed reports place the total number of Chinese 
immigrants at 10,000, but Yu thinks the number is much 
smaller.  He bases his estimates on knowledge gained through 
his personal network of contacts.  He said only two years ago 
there were less than 50 Chinese in Georgia, but that number 
rapidly is increasing.  He attributes some of the increase to 
Chinese living in Europe looking for a fresh market with less 
competition.  Approximately 100 of last year's arrivals came 
from the Balkans and about 30-40 came from the Czech Republic 
and in turn brought their relatives from China.  He estimates 
there are now 600-700 Chinese living in Georgia, including 
those working for the Chinese Embassy.   He said last year 
border guards estimated about 3000 Chinese exited and entered 
Georgia -- some like himself with multiple trips.  He also 
said the Chinese Embassy issued about 3500 visas last year 
for Georgian residents -- including third-country nationals 
-- to visit China.  According to some local Chinese shop 
owners, the Chinese government actively promotes emigration. 
These shop owners were interested in emigrating from China, 
picked Georgia as their destination country, received 
 
TBILISI 00001624  003.2 OF 003 
 
 
Georgian language training, and were released from the 
two-child rule. 
 
Comment: Fear of the "Incomprehensible" 
--------------------------------------- 
 
8. (C) Comment. There is an increasing buzz of mistrust and 
fear of Chinese immigrants in the Georgian press.  Georgians 
worry a mass influx of a people with a completely unknown 
culture will threaten its demographic distribution and 
national security -- at a time when the Georgian population 
probably is decreasing.  The word for "Chinese" in the 
Georgian language has been used for years as an adjective to 
describe something completely incomprehensible.  Whereas 
increased investment from Kazakhstan and other Central Asian 
countries also brings immigrants, Georgia has a historic 
context with them as part of the former Soviet Union that it 
does not with China.  As Georgia markets itself abroad as a 
destination for FDI, GoG leadership at home will need to 
manage effectively a public increasingly fearful of being 
overrun by an unknown culture.  Steve Yu said most Chinese he 
knows do not like living in Georgia because they perceive 
their standard of living to be lower here than in China.  It 
is likely that as long as there is money to be made in 
Georgia, however, they will continue to come and stay.  End 
Comment. 
 
 
 
 
 
TEFFT

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07TBILISI1622, OCTOBER LAUNCH OF JUDICIAL TRAINING PROGRAM TAKES

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
07TBILISI1622 2007-07-10 05:27 2011-08-30 01:44 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Tbilisi

VZCZCXRO7613
PP RUEHAG RUEHAST RUEHDA RUEHDBU RUEHDF RUEHFL RUEHIK RUEHKW RUEHLA
RUEHLN RUEHLZ RUEHPOD RUEHROV RUEHSR RUEHVK RUEHYG
DE RUEHSI #1622/01 1910527
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 100527Z JUL 07
FM AMEMBASSY TBILISI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 6944
INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 TBILISI 001622 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PGOV PHUM GG
SUBJECT: OCTOBER LAUNCH OF JUDICIAL TRAINING PROGRAM TAKES 
FORM 
 
REF: A. TBILISI 268 
 
     B. TBILISI 281 
     C. TBILISI 767 
     D. TBILISI 932 
     E. TBILISI 1479 
 
1. (SBU) Summary.  The USAID Caucasus Mission Director and 
Poloff attended the opening of a new High School of Justice 
(HSOJ) facility on 22 June in Tskaltubo (Kutaisi) where the 
Georgian Chairman of the Supreme Court released to the 
international community copies of the much anticipated 
curriculum for the training of new judges (reftel A, B). The 
release of the curriculum validated earlier conversations 
with ministry officials that the curriculum would soon be 
made available to the public (reftel C,D,E). Publication of 
the curriculum heralds yet another milestone in the 
continuing advance of Georgia to develop a more professional 
and independent judiciary.  End Summary. 
 
-------------------------------------- 
HSOJ CURRICULUM AND INSTRUCTORS READY 
-------------------------------------- 
 
2. (U) The USAID Mission Caucasus Director and Poloff 
attended a press conference in Tskaltubo on 22 June which 
marked the opening of the Tskaltubo Regional Center of the 
High School of Justice. The main office of the HSOJ is 
located in Tbilisi.  To better serve the regions, two 
branches of the HSOJ have been established in Batumi and 
Tkhaltubo. Konstantine Kublashvili, Chairman of the Supreme 
Court, held a press conference to share with the 
international community copies of the HSCOJ curriculum and 
particulars about on-going training for judges already on the 
bench. He took questions from the floor about draft 
legislation dealing with judicial reform and shared 
information about the increase in judges and court workers 
salaries planned for next year.  His presentation answered 
many previously open questions about the HSOJ curriculum 
which no one had seen prior to this event. Further validation 
of the program will take place beginning 9 July. 
 
3.  (U) The HSOJ in its new format becomes operative in 
October 2007; judges from this time will no longer be 
appointed by the President and only HSOJ graduates will be 
eligible for the judicial election process. The current plan 
stipulates that judges graduating from the HSOJ will work as 
first instance judges either as magistrate judges or first 
instance judges, hearing cases on administrative, civil and 
pre-trial issues in criminal matters. Magistrates who are 
appointed in the specific areas of the 
administrative-territorial unit under the jurisdiction of the 
district court ensure that people in the areas remote from 
the district court have speedy access to justice locally.  In 
this way, the District Courts will assist in decreasing the 
large backlog of cases, thereby lowering the number of those 
in pre-trail detention. The HSOJ curriculum will consist of 
14 months of training, nine of these months in an academic 
setting, and five months practical application.  There will 
be a final exam and interview at t 
he end of the training before new judges assume their duties. 
Currently representatives from OSCE are suggesting the GoG 
extend the program up to two years, but any changes would not 
be in effect until 2008. 
 
4. (U) The HSOJ curriculum was developed based on the 
provisions of Chapter VI of the Law of Georgia on the HSOJ 
but uses a French model as a basis.  It provides a detailed 
description of the subjects to be taught and activities to be 
completed during the theoretical course, internship program 
and seminar work all of which are required by Article 19 of 
the Law. The main objective of the program is to deepen the 
theoretical knowledge of the judicial candidates and give 
them the needed practical skills, as well as help them 
realize the extent of their future responsibility and the 
importance of maintaining judicial independence within the 
bounds of the law. 
 
----------------- 
The Formal Course 
----------------- 
 
5. (SBU) Sitting judges will teach the theoretical course 
using lectures, practice-centered work, discussion, and 
homework to achieve the objectives of the course.  Shota 
Rukhadze, Deputy of the HSOJ, told Poloff that the majority 
of the trainers will be sitting judges, as the instruction 
will be practice-oriented and only judges have this 
experience.  University professors or other lawyers wouldn't 
have this expertise necessarily. Currently, Rukhadze is 
seeking other qualified professional instructors but the 
final list of trainers is not yet determined. Rukhadze told 
 
TBILISI 00001622  002 OF 003 
 
 
Poloff that the instructors' fees had been calculated into 
the 2007 budget and passed to the Ministry of Finance.  The 
calculation was based on the highest daily rate in Georgian 
educational institutions.   English language courses will be 
mandatory twice weekly during this segment, with an emphasis 
on English legal terminology.  Students who study at the HSOJ 
will r
esign their permanent jobs and be full time students; 
the government will allot 
 them a monthly stipend of 600-650 GEL (390 USD). The total 
number of new students for initial training will be 25-30, 
which is the number provided to the HSOJ by the High Council 
of Justice.  These students will be divided between the 
institutions in Tbilisi, Batumi and Tskaltubo.  Most of the 
training for new students will be in Tbilisi; Batumi and 
Tskaltubo will be used more for retraining of sitting judges. 
 
SIPDIS 
 
6. (U) The theoretical Course for Judicial Candidates for the 
October course will include the following topics: 
- Constitutional Law 
- Criminal law 
- Criminal Procedural Law 
- Civil Law 
- Civil Procedural Law 
- Administrative Law 
- Administrative Procedural Law 
- Tax Law and Customs Code 
- International Law 
- Law in Cinema 
- Computer and New Information Technologies 
 
---------------------- 
The Internship Program 
---------------------- 
 
7. (U) After completion of the nine month theoretical course, 
the students of justice will be required to complete a 
compulsory and alternative practical internship program.  The 
length of the compulsory internship program is three months, 
during which the students will spend time in the common 
courts of Georgia, or upon approval, either in the 
Prosecutor's Office, law firms, or public notaries.  During 
the internship program, the students of justice will go on 
site to different common courts to learn in detail of court 
operations, starting from the functioning of court 
chancelleries to making decisions on each particular case. 
 
--------------------------------------------- ---------- 
Seminars--the Formal Course and Internship in Practice 
--------------------------------------------- ---------- 
 
8. (U) At the end of the internship program the students of 
justice will complete a two-month seminar program the purpose 
of which is to generalize the knowledge and practical 
experience the students of justice received during the 
theoretical course and practical internship program.  During 
the seminars, the students of justice will be given concrete 
practical homework (such as writing judicial decisions based 
on hypothetical cases, drafting various procedural documents, 
etc.) which will further improve their knowledge and prepare 
them for the final graduating exam. 
 
--------------------------------------------- 
Judges and Court Workers Salaries to Increase 
--------------------------------------------- 
 
9. (U) During his presentation, Kublashvili announced that 
Parliament recently passed a law to increase judges' salaries 
monthly by 100 GEL(60 USD), which would be retroactive to 1 
January. In 2008 there are plans to further increase judges' 
monthly salaries by up to as much as 210 GEL (126 USD) per 
month.  Additionally, the Parliament is considering raising 
the salaries of Tbilisi District Court workers, as they earn 
significantly less than judges.  Court workers currently 
receive 250 GEL (150 USD) a month, whereas judges receive 
1500 GEL (899 USD) or more. 
 
 
------- 
Comment 
------- 
 
10. (SBU) The completion of the HSOJ curriculum is another 
milestone for the Georgians in their efforts to strengthen 
their judicial arm by having a cadre of professional judges 
who are not appointed by the executive arm but through a 
recognized transparent process. The curriculum still has yet 
to be approved by the High Council of Justice before the 
start of the HSOJ term begins in October.  Kublashvili's 
announcement and promulgation of the curriculum has finally 
answered the questions as to what the new judges will study 
and how.  The looming question still remains where will the 
 
TBILISI 00001622  003 OF 003 
 
 
HSOJ find additional instructors and will they be ready for 
the course start date in October. We will keep pressing the 
GoG to ensure that they meet this deadline. End Comment. 
TEFFT

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07TBILISI1621, DETAINEE TREATMENT BETTER–TRANSPARENCY STILL

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
07TBILISI1621 2007-07-09 13:39 2011-08-30 01:44 CONFIDENTIAL Embassy Tbilisi

VZCZCXRO8108
PP RUEHDBU RUEHFL RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHROV RUEHSR
DE RUEHSI #1621/01 1901339
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 091339Z JUL 07 ZDK ZDK///SVCS FROM ALL ADDRESSEES//
FM AMEMBASSY TBILISI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 6942
INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 TBILISI 001621 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/09/2017 
TAGS: PGOV PHUM GG
SUBJECT: DETAINEE TREATMENT BETTER--TRANSPARENCY STILL 
LACKING 
 
REF: A. TBILISI 1042 
 
     B. TBILISI 1299 
 
TBILISI 00001621  001.2 OF 002 
 
 
Classified By: Ambassador John F. Tefft for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). 
 
1.  (C) SUMMARY: Georgia's Ombudsman told DCM and Poloff in a 
meeting on 5 July that detainee treatment at pre-trial 
detention centers has improved due to monitoring of these 
venues.  He recounted specific cases where independence of 
courts, instances of misuse of power by police, government's 
infringement of property rights of citizens, and inadequate 
prison conditions for inmates still continue.  Subari 
expressed his satisfaction with the U.S. State Department's 
Human Rights Report (HRR) for Georgia which he said helped 
him in his work and his dealings with the Georgian executive 
and legislative branches.  END SUMMARY. 
 
-------------------------------------- 
The Role of the Public Defender Office 
-------------------------------------- 
 
2.  (C) DCM and Poloff met with Sozar Subari, Georgia's 
Public Defender/Ombudsman, on 5 July.  At the outset of the 
meeting Subari described the mandate of the Public Defender. 
His office is permitted to receive information from any 
government agency and provide recommendations to the 
appropriate agency; his recommendations, however, are not 
binding.  The Public Defender's Office is a parliamentary 
agency and is accountable to Parliament. 
 
 
---------------------------------------- 
Detainee Maltreatment Down, Funding Up 
---------------------------------------- 
 
3. (C)  Subari related to DCM and Poloff that the incidents 
of maltreatment of pre-trial detainees are decreasing 
following the introduction of Ombudsman's monitoring of these 
venues (reftel A).  As a result of "unannounced visits" by 
the Ombudsman's staff, the incidence of physical abuse of 
detainees has significantly decreased, and special record 
books on detainees are reviewed to ensure that detainees are 
being logged into the system and relatives are notified of 
their detention in a timely manner.  Additionally, Subari 
noted that the increase of funding from 300,000 GEL (179, 640 
USD) to 600,000 GEL (359,282 USD) for inmate health care was 
a positive sign, although the increase is still not 
sufficient and serious health problems remain in the prison 
health care system.  He highlighted in particular the spread 
of tuberculosis, inadequate treatment of diagnosed 
inmate-patients, and poor practice of maintaining medical 
records as lingering problems. The subordination of the 
prison health system is unclear as 
 to whether it belongs to the Ministry of Justice or to the 
Ministry of Health and this lack of clarity has no one agency 
in a responsive role. 
 
------------------ 
Lingering Problems 
------------------ 
 
4.  (C) Subari stressed that major human rights problems 
still are prevalent in the country due to the lack of 
independence of courts, instances of abuse of power by 
police, government's infringement on property rights, and 
inadequate prison conditions (reftel B). He highlighted 
specific instances of police falsification of evidence in the 
killing of Robakidze by the patrol police in 2004 and recent 
inhumane treatment of inmates in Rustavi prison where inmates 
were kept naked for the purpose of punishment.  Subari 
underlined the inappropriate actions and corruptness of the 
Special Operation Department (MOIA), and their involvement in 
the illegal detention of three young men in Svaneti. His 
professional opinion is that Georgia's judicial system is not 
yet mature enough to ban the presence of video and television 
cameras in the courtroom.  He acknowledged that perhaps in 
America this would be understandable, but in Georgia there is 
still strong distrust of the judicial branch and passage of a 
law prohibiting re 
cording devices from the courtroom would only cement further 
this distrust. 
 
----------------------------- 
Lack of Parliamentary Support 
----------------------------- 
 
5. (C)  Subari regretfully noted the lack of Parliament's 
support to his agency.  He recalled in particular 
Parliament's reaction to his 2005 annual report which was 
critical of the religious minorities' situation in Georgia. 
In the course of his presentation, the majority of the 
Parliament walked out in protest.  Parliament was also very 
 
TBILISI 00001621  002.2 OF 002 
 
 
late in adopting its resolution on the report.  When the 
resolution was adopted, its stated that the Parliament did 
not share the Ombudsman's position on the religious minority 
issues.  Subari stressed that the same reaction occurred to 
his 2006 report to which he is still awaiting a reply. During 
the last year the Public Defender's Office has submitted 
seven claims to the Constitutional Court of Georgia, but only 
one of those has been satisfied.  He specifically noted a 
particular incident when the Parliament adopted a certain 
provision overruled by the Constitutional Court. The 
provision refers to the purchase of the minimal amo
unt of 
shares in the possession of share-hold 
ers in a joint-stock company by the owners of the majority of 
shares at a "fair price" against the will of their owners. 
The Ombudsman's Office filed a lawsuit with the 
Constitutional Court on behalf of the owners of the minimal 
amount of shares and won the case, but the Parliament 
disregarded this precedent. 
 
-------------- 
Praise for HRR 
-------------- 
 
6. (C) Subari expressed his satisfaction with the HRR for 
Georgia which he said helped him in his regular work dealing 
with the Georgian executive and legislative branches.  He 
expressed frustration at the lack of support for his work by 
the executive and legislative branches; he said that the HRR 
echoed many of his same concerns and that it gave additional 
credence to his concerns before the other two branches. 
 
7. (C) Subari told Poloff that in contrast to other public 
structures where budgets have grown 200 per cent or more, his 
budget has not increased in the last three years, despite the 
increase in workload.  He himself admits that his two 
priorities, the fight against torture and protection of the 
rights of national and ethnic minorities are not 
enthusiastically embraced by the administration and often put 
him in direct opposition to the powers that be.  He noted 
with pride that the prestige of his office has grown and now 
occupies second place only to the Georgian Orthodox Church as 
far as public trust. 
TEFFT

Wikileaks

07TBILISI1619, GOOD SIGNS AND BAD AT SOUTH OSSETIA DONORS’

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
07TBILISI1619 2007-07-09 13:21 2011-08-30 01:44 CONFIDENTIAL Embassy Tbilisi

VZCZCXRO6945
OO RUEHDBU RUEHFL RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHROV RUEHSR
DE RUEHSI #1619/01 1901321
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 091321Z JUL 07
FM AMEMBASSY TBILISI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 6939
INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 TBILISI 001619 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR EUR DAS BRYZA AND EUR/CARC 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/06/2017 
TAGS: PREL PGOV EAID OSCE GG
SUBJECT: GOOD SIGNS AND BAD AT SOUTH OSSETIA DONORS' 
STEERING COMMITTEE MEETING 
 
REF: A. TBILISI 1573 
 
     B. TBILISI 1563 
     C. TBILISI 1540 
 
Classified By: Ambassador John F. Tefft for reasons 1.4(b)&(d). 
 
Summary 
------- 
1. (C) A July 2 meeting in Tskhinvali of the Steering 
Committee for the donors' South Ossetia economic 
rehabilitation projects was marked by confrontations between 
the Georgian and South Ossetian sides -- including over 
whether the Georgian delegation would be allowed into South 
Ossetia for the meeting, and over proposals for inspection of 
the regions' contested drinking water pipeline.  In between 
these disputes, however, the sides managed to agree to 
authorize contracting for the first three school 
reconstruction projects, and endorsed moving ahead in other 
areas as well.  End Summary. 
 
Difficult Entry, Difficult Exit 
------------------------------- 
2. (C) The meeting, which had been delayed several weeks 
because of Georgian concerns about a lack of information on 
the projects (ref C), started over two hours late, in part 
because South Ossetian officials initially refused to allow 
the Georgian delegation to enter the separatist region. 
South Ossetian officials explained to donor representatives 
during the wait that they had told the Georgians each side 
would be limited to two participants, but the Georgians 
showed up with four officials of the State Ministry of 
Conflict Resolution.  After considerable negotiation the 
South Ossetians relented and allowed all four Georgians in 
for the meeting.  Donors would later find it difficult to 
exit South Ossetia as well; by the time the meeting was over 
Georgian farmers protesting the South Ossetians' closure of 
an irrigation canal had blocked and partially dug up the 
Transcaucasian Highway just inside Georgian-controlled 
territory south of Tskhinvali.  Donors took another route 
back to Tbilisi. 
 
Impasse over Pipe Inspection 
---------------------------- 
3. (SBU) Although it was not an item on the meeting's agenda, 
the sides spent much time sparring over proposals for a joint 
inspection of the drinking water pipeline that runs from the 
separatist-controlled north, through a Georgian enclave, to 
Tskhinvali (ref B).  The Georgians proposed that, after the 
 
SIPDIS 
meeting, participants travel to Java in the separatist area, 
and proceed from there to conduct a full inspection of the 
pipe, including in Georgian areas.  The South Ossetians 
refused, insisting that an inspection begin in Kheiti, where 
the Georgians repaired a damaged section of pipe in early 
June, and proceed elsewhere from there.  No agreement was 
reached (ref A), and each side expressed certainty that any 
problems affecting water volume were caused in the other 
side's area.  DCM noted that the donors' projects were 
intended to help solve problems such as this, and urged the 
sides to use the opportunity to improve the water network 
rather than arguing about where to start an inspection. 
 
And Yet...Some Progress 
----------------------- 
4. (SBU) Despite all the difficulties, the two sides agreed 
to all the items OSCE had put on the meeting's official 
agenda, most notably authorizing OSCE to contract for the 
reconstruction of three schools.  OSCE agreed that it would 
share with the sides by July 3 full documentation about all 
bids for the projects, with the understanding that if neither 
side objected by July 5 OSCE could go ahead.  (OSCE confirmed 
to us July 6 that both sides had received the materials and 
neither had voiced objections.)  Participants also endorsed 
OSCE's proposal to plan for constructing a combined clinic 
and school in Sveri, a modification of the originally agreed 
project that was only a clinic.  The sides also expressed 
support for OSCE's approach on several water-related 
projects, three of which are nearing the conclusion of the 
bidding process, and responded positively to OSCE's 
suggestion of another Steering Committee meeting in the near 
feature to focus on water issues.  OSCE briefed on ongoing 
agricultural and business development trainings and other 
activities, and the Georgians expressed concerns about South 
Ossetian efforts to limit participation in certain activities. 
 
Comment 
------- 
5. (C) While this meeting contained more than the usual 
amount of confrontation between the sides, in the end it 
achieved everything OSCE had hoped it would, permitting the 
first school re-construction projects to get underway.  Since 
 
TBILISI 00001619  002 OF 002 
 
 
the meeting, the Georgians have taken at least two steps 
designed to lower tensions: seeking agreement for an OSCE 
team to inspect the drinking water pipe, and proposing a 
meeting of the Joint Control Commission (JCC) without a set 
agenda (although the South Ossetians subsequently announced 
they could not accept the Georgians' proposed site, Tbilisi). 
 Neverthele
ss, as a sudden standoff between the sides in 
Avnevi July 6 demonstrates, the potential for a major 
escalation in tensions remains. 
 
TEFFT

Wikileaks

07TBILISI1605, MERABISHVILI ON WHAT’S NEXT IN SOUTH OSSETIA

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
07TBILISI1605 2007-07-06 11:40 2011-08-30 01:44 CONFIDENTIAL Embassy Tbilisi

VZCZCXRO4991
OO RUEHDBU RUEHFL RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHROV RUEHSR
DE RUEHSI #1605/01 1871140
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 061140Z JUL 07
FM AMEMBASSY TBILISI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 6905
INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 TBILISI 001605 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR EUR DAS BRYZA & EUR/CARC 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/06/2017 
TAGS: PGOV PREL GG
SUBJECT: MERABISHVILI ON WHAT'S NEXT IN SOUTH OSSETIA 
 
REF: TBILISI 1562 
 
Classified By: Ambassador John F. Tefft for reasons 1.4(b)&(d). 
 
Summary 
------- 
1. (C) Georgian Minister of Internal Affairs Vano 
Merabishvili told the Ambassador July 5 that while he thought 
tensions would continue in South Ossetia, he did not expect a 
major escalation.  He said the Georgians hoped to be able to 
recruit a number of prominent de facto officials at the 
"deputy minister" level to jump ship and join the temporary 
administrative unit of Dmitry Sanakoyev.  He said de facto 
leader Eduard Kokoity was aware that his position was 
eroding, but Merabishvili expressed doubt that Kokoity had 
the ability to carry out a major provocation, both because of 
the controlling presence of Russian FSB officers in his 
administration, and because South Ossetian militia would be 
reluctant to get into an overly bloody fight with the 
Georgians.  The Ambassador stressed the importance of giving 
Sanakoyev real autonomy and sufficient time to build his 
local base of support.  Merabishvili expressed disappointment 
that Sochi had won the 2014 Winter Olympics, predicting this 
would lead to a greater Russian financial stake in Abkhazia. 
End Summary. 
 
South Ossetia Simmering, Not Boiling Over 
----------------------------------------- 
2. (C) Merabishvili told the Ambassador in a lunch meeting 
that tensions were likely to continue in South Ossetia, 
stoked by such things as a recent Russian shipment to the de 
facto authorities of mobile artillery and other equipment, 
including one additional GRAD missile.  Merabishvili said he 
was highly skeptical of efforts to cut a Russian-Georgian 
deal to resolve the conflict, because he did not believe the 
Russians wanted to change the status quo.  While 
acknowledging that a number of points of tension had arisen 
recently in South Ossetia, Merabishvili said he did not 
believe the situation would escalate out of control, in part 
because the Russian FSB ran things in South Ossetia through 
its officers in high positions in Tskhinvali.  He added that 
Kokoity's first preference might be an all-out war, even one 
that the Georgians won, because that would assure him a 
comfortable future in Russia.  But Merabishvili did not think 
Kokoity was strong enough to carry out a major escalation, 
such as the killing of a large number of Georgians.  He said 
South Ossetian forces were averse to fatalities, and it would 
be hard to convince them to carry out extreme orders. 
 
3. (C) Merabishvili said Sanakoyev's position was 
strengthening daily, and he pointed to Sanakoyev's recent 
speech in Brussels (reftel) as an important step -- something 
the de facto authorities implicitly acknowledged when they 
shut off power in Tskhinvali in a laughable attempt to 
suppress news of the speech.  He said Sanakoyev and the 
Georgians were appealing to influential figures in the de 
facto administration -- mostly deputy ministers since the 
ministers are Russians -- to join Sanakoyev's team.  He said 
that many were interested, despite intense pressure from the 
FSB to prevent them from switching.  Merabishvili said that 
there was a good chance -- although he could "not say a 50-50 
chance" -- that a sizable number of officials would switch 
sides soon.  He said that if given a free choice, the 
majority of South Ossetians would go with Sanakoyev. 
 
4. (C) The Ambassador asked how plans were going for 
consultations between the Georgians and Sanakoyev on the 
details of autonomy, and Merabishvili said the plans remained 
unchanged but there was currently some dispute within the 
Georgian government about which ministry -- Merabishvili's 
and/or others -- should have the lead on consultations. 
Merabishvili said that unfortunately the Ministry of Internal 
Affairs was still serving as the intermediary between 
Sanakoyev and others both in and out of the government, but 
he hoped to encourage the development of direct relationships 
between Sanakoyev and other ministries.  Merabishvili added 
that Jemal Karkusov, Minister of Internal Affairs of 
Sanakoyev's administrative unit, had gone along on 
Merabishvili's recent trip to Lithuania.  He said Karkusov 
had been overwhelmed by the welcome he had received from the 
Lithuanian government, far better than the humiliating 
treatment Karkusov had received in Moscow during his time as 
de facto minister of internal affairs in Tskhinvali.  The 
Ambassador stressed that Sanakoyev would benefit politically 
from a specific identification of the powers held by his 
administrative unit, and from sufficient time to build his 
support with the population. 
 
From Russia with Cash 
--------------------- 
5. (C) Turning to Abkhazia, Merabishvili said he personally 
 
TBILISI 00001605  002 OF 002 
 
 
did not believe Russia would recognize the independence of 
Abkhazia, explaining that Russia's interests are best served 
by the status quo.  He said that the awarding of the 2014 
Winter Olympics to Sochi -- announced less than a day before 
-- was unwelcome news to the Georgians.  Merabishvili said he 
understood Russia had spent
into the billions of dollars in 
various countries to win support for Sochi's bid.  He 
predicted that the Olympics would drive up property values 
around Sochi, leading more Russians to buy land and to invest 
in neighboring Abkhazia.  He said this would have negative 
consequences for Georgia over time, because such financial 
interests often played a key role in determining Russian 
policies.  (Note: Merabishvili's private comments contrast 
with public statements by Saakashvili, made both before and 
after the Olympic decision, expressing Georgian support for 
Sochi's bid.  End Note.) 
 
Comment 
------- 
6. (C) As in previous conversations, Merabishvili gave an 
upbeat assessment of the growth of Sanakoyev's popularity in 
South Ossetia.  We have heard markedly different assessments 
on this subject from others with connections in South 
Ossetia, and it is difficult to determine the truth in the 
rigidly controlled environment in Tskhinvali.  Some (but not 
all) OSCE Mission members are convinced that most South 
Ossetians see Sanakoyev as a traitor, and that this 
perception has been reinforced by the recent tensions over 
water, roads, and sniper fire between the two sides.  Former 
Georgian Defense Minister Okruashvili, an old rival of 
Merabishvili's with little use for the Sanakoyev project, 
recently told the Ambassador that the Georgians had "failed" 
in their efforts to bring prominent members of the de facto 
government over to Sanakoyev's side.  Merabishvili clearly 
remains hopeful that key de facto officials will defect, and 
the outcome of this recruitment process may be a useful 
measure of which way the tide is turning. 
 
TEFFT

Wikileaks

07TBILISI1604, ABKHAZIA: GENEVA-STYLE MEETING IN BONN: SMALL

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If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol).Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags #cablegate and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. #07TBILISI1604.
Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
07TBILISI1604 2007-07-06 11:36 2011-08-30 01:44 CONFIDENTIAL Embassy Tbilisi

VZCZCXRO4976
OO RUEHDBU RUEHFL RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHROV RUEHSR
DE RUEHSI #1604/01 1871136
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 061136Z JUL 07
FM AMEMBASSY TBILISI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 6899
INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 06 TBILISI 001604 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPARTMENT FOR DAS BRYZA AND EUR/CARC 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/22/2017 
TAGS: PGOV PREL PBTS KPKO UNSC GG RU
SUBJECT: ABKHAZIA:  GENEVA-STYLE MEETING IN BONN:  SMALL 
STEPS FORWARD 
 
REF: TBILISI 459 
 
Classified By: AMBASSADOR JOHN F. TEFFT.  REASONS:  1.4 (B) AND (D). 
 
1. (C) SUMMARY:  On June 27 and 28, representatives of the 
Friends of the UN Secretary General (FSG), together with the 
UN, met the Georgian and Abkhaz sides for a Geneva-style 
meeting in Bonn.  Most significantly, the sides agreed to 
resume Quadripartite meetings on law enforcement cooperation 
in July and agreed to a Joint Fact Finding Group (JFFG) 
investigation of the disappearance of David Sigua, an ethnic 
Georgian official from the Abkhaz de facto administration. 
Both sides agreed to explore confidence building measures 
endorsed by UNSCR 1752, including establishing maritime 
communication between Sukhumi and Trabzon, Turkey, with 
appropriate custom controls.  They also agreed to a Steering 
Committee meeting for the EC-funded rehabilitation program in 
Abkhazia during the week of July 2.  Additionally, they 
agreed to continued people-to-people contacts and to continue 
cooperation on threats such as African Swine Fever.  Although 
the Georgians repeated an unconditional offer for a meeting 
between President Saakashvili and de facto "president" 
Bagapsh, the Abkhaz, supported by Russia, insisted such a 
meeting needed advance coordination on a guaranteed outcome 
such as the lifting of CIS economic sanctions or an agreement 
on non-use of force.  The Friends expressed concern about the 
security situation, particularly in Gali, and urged the 
Georgian side to move a Patriotic Youth Camp in the village 
of Gunmukhuri away from the ceasefire line to avoid potential 
mishaps.  To follow-up on these commitments, the UN will work 
to coordinate monthly meetings of the sides in Tbilisi or 
Sukhumi to monitor implementation.  After meetings between 
FSG coordinator Hans-Dieter Lucas with both sides in the 
region during the week of July 2, the UN may consider a 
high-level letter to the sides from New York urging progress 
on the agreed cooperation mechanisms.  End summary. 
 
2. (C) On June 27 and 28, the UN hosted representatives of 
the FSG (U.S., UK, Germany, France, and Russia) in Bonn for a 
Geneva-style meeting with the Georgian and Abkhaz sides.  UN 
Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) Under Secretary 
Jean-Marie Guehenno chaired the discussion.  Special 
Representative of the Secretary General (SRSG) Jean Arnault, 
together with members of his staff and a representative of 
the UN's Department of Political Affairs (DPA), were also 
present.  Representing the Georgians were State Minister for 
Conflict Resolution Merab Antadze and Deputy Minister of 
Internal Affairs Eka Zguladze, together with Dimitri 
Manjavidze (one of Antadze,s deputies) and Alexander 
Nalbandov (a representative from the MFA).  Representing the 
Abkhaz were de facto "foreign minister" Sergey Shamba and 
Martin Targyl from his staff as well as two German-based 
members of the Abkhaz diaspora, Khibla Amichba and Zeki Kap. 
The FSG were represented by EUR DAS Matthew Bryza, Sir Brian 
Fall (UK), Hans-Dieter Lucas (Germany), Veronique Bujon-Barre 
(France), and Vladislav Chernov (Russian Federation), as well 
as their delegations. 
 
----------------------------------------- 
UN EMPHASIZES SECURITY, DIALOGUE AND CBMS 
----------------------------------------- 
 
3. (C) The meetings began with an introduction by Guehenno 
followed by separate presentations from each of the sides. 
Following a dinner consultation the previous evening with the 
Friends, Guehenno emphasized three main points in his 
introduction:  one, that the Friends are concerned about the 
security situation in Abkhazia and would like a commitment 
from both sides to refrain from provocations that would lead 
to an escalation of violence; two, that the Friends urge a 
resumption of dialogue between the sides, especially the 
resumption of regular Quadripartite meetings to discuss law 
enforcement cooperation; and three, that the Friends urge the 
sides to review confidence building measures presented at the 
Geneva meeting in February (reftel) and endorsed by the UN 
Security Council in April, with a view to implementing them 
in order to build trust and move toward a settlement. 
 
------------------------------------------ 
GEORGIANS SUPPORT RE-ESTABLISHING DIALOGUE 
------------------------------------------ 
 
4. (C) Antadze expressed Georgian concern about the lack of 
dialogue and hoped that the Friends would help to 
re-establish dialogue in existing formats as well as in other 
formats.  Stressing the importance of the return of 
internally displaced persons (IDP)s, Antadze said that the 
Abkhaz were undertaking measures, including legislative 
measures, which were preventing their return.  To address 
these concerns, he suggested resuming the Special Commission 
 
TBILISI 00001604  002 OF 006 
 
 
on IDPs called for in the April 4, 1994 quadripartite 
agreement.  Antad
ze welcomed the creation of a UN human 
rights office in Gali as a first step. He argued that its 
implementation was important for the return of IDPs.  He 
noted the importance of UN Civilian Police and expressed a 
need for a clear, transparent program with clarity on their 
role and mandate.  Antadze said the Georgians have ideas in 
the economic field that could also increase trust and 
confidence among various strata of the population. 
 
5. (C) Antadze said the Abkhaz were blocking direct dialogue. 
 On Georgian presence in the Upper Kodori (or "Upper 
Abkhazia" as they call it), Antadze said that the Georgians 
honored the commitments with regards to transparency that 
they made in Geneva in February, as verified by monitoring 
missions by the UN and CIS Peacekeeping Force.  He said the 
Abkhaz refused to participate in the security dialogue that 
was supposed to follow the Geneva meeting.  He said the 
Abkhaz had also canceled talks planned between Prime Minister 
Noghaideli and the Abkhaz "prime minister" as well as 
discussions planned for energy experts from both sides to 
discuss the Enguri power plant situation.  On the 
disappearance of Sigua, Antadze proposed a JFFG 
investigation.  On the Patriotic Camp near the ceasefire 
line, he proposed that the UN and FSG visit the camp to 
dispel international concerns of its function and purpose, 
which he said was to bring together young people from Georgia 
to participate in sports activities and entertainment 
programs. 
 
6. (C) The Western Friends welcomed the Georgian commitment 
to dialogue and expressed continuing concern over getting to 
the bottom of the Sigua case and about the location of the 
patriot youth camp - not for its activities but for the 
potential of youth to undertake an action that could lead to 
an escalation of conflict.   Bryza urged the Georgians to 
consider relocating the camp to a less sensitive area.  Bryza 
and the other Friends urged the Georgians to review the CBMs 
endorsed by the Security Council and to resume Quadripartite 
meetings.  Striking a different tone, Chernov said the 
Georgian side is continuing to hinder progress toward a 
settlement, despite expressing willingness to move forward. 
He alleged ongoing violations of the Moscow Agreement, 
including overflights; deployment of over 600 police in the 
Security Zone; illegal movements into the Upper Kodori; and 
the illegal presence of armed groups, including two new 
alleged observation points established in Abkhaz-controlled 
areas that Moscow had informed him about that very morning. 
Chernov noted dourly that such actions could lead to the 
activation of military activity in the region and that the 
Georgians could not expect flexibility from the Abkhaz on 
refugee returns in the face of them.  Chernov also attacked a 
recent Georgian MFA statement that the separatist conflicts 
were of a territorial and not an ethnic nature.  He said it 
belied an attitude toward ethnic minorities that was 
counterproductive to the conflict resolution process. 
 
7. (C) Antadze responded that every time there is a meeting 
planned between the Georgians and the Abkhaz, there is a 
provocation from the Russian side which makes dialogue 
difficult.  Zguladze said that the Georgians had appointed a 
Coordinator for the Quadripartite meetings last fall.  She 
said that only two security incidents had taken place in 
Upper Kodori since the Georgians regained control:  a 
military attack against the Minister of Internal Affairs and 
another on March 11 against the government building. 
Zguladze said that UN investigations into both attacks had 
shown that Georgia is not instigating provocations in the 
Upper Kodori.  She expressed disappointment that the final 
report of the JFFG investigation into the March 11 attack had 
not yet been made public and expressed hope that it would in 
the near future.  (Note:  To the FSG, Arnault said that the 
report was in the process of being translated into Russian; 
he hoped that the JFFG members might agree to its findings as 
soon as June 29.  End note.)  She pushed back against 
sensitivities concerning the location of the patriot camp, 
nothing that there was no possible way it could be considered 
a threat to the security situation.  Zguladze continued that 
Georgia exploded all weapons recovered from warlord Emzar 
Kvitsiani and had reduced the number of police to 270 and 
that this was confirmed by CIS PKF and UN monitoring 
missions.  She cautioned that Georgia may have to reassess 
its position on reduction of police based on the results of 
the report on the March 11 attack.  Zguladze acknowledged 
that logistical problems contributed to continuing Georgian 
violations on movements in the Security Zone, but she said 
the violations had decreased and that the notification 
mechanism had improved.  Nalbandov countered Chernov,s 
allegation about the ethnic prejudice in Georgian society by 
reiterating Georgia,s position that the conflicts are 
 
TBILISI 00001604  003 OF 006 
 
 
territorial and drawing on his own Armenian heritage to 
legitimize his claim that Georgia,s constitution and 
international commitments protect minority rights. 
 
---------------------------------- 
ABKHAZ START TOUGH BUT THEN SOFTEN 
---------------------------------- 
 
8. (C) Shamba opened with a plea to allow the Abkhaz to 
address the UN Security Council as they are "equal parties in 
the conflict."  He claimed that UN documents describing the 
conflict had changed over time to call it the "conflict in 
Abkhazia, Georgia" and that the UN should go back to the 
original formulation ("Georgia/Abkhazia conflict") which he 
believed gave equal weight to the Abkhaz position.  Shamba 
claimed that the Georgians were conducting ongoing 
provocations that violated UNSCR 1716, the Moscow Agreement, 
and a certain "Gagra Agreement" of 1998 that contained clear 
formulations on the Kodori Valley.  He claimed there were 
more than 1300 police in the Security Zone, whereas only 600 
are allowed.  He also cited the possibility that the patriot 
camp near the ceasefire line could be used as a military camp 
by the Georgians.  Finally, he pointed to what he called the 
kidnapping of Abkhaz officials, including Chakaberia and 
Sigua.  He claimed that witnesses knew that Sigua was killed 
and even where he was buried. After this became public, he 
said the body was exhumed and taken somewhere else.  He 
claimed that Georgia was in violation of the Moscow Agreement 
with an expansion of its presence in Upper Kodori and the 
establishment of two new observation points (in 
Abkhaz-controlled territory.)  He agreed on the need to 
return to dialogue and called for the Georgians to consider 
Abkhaz suggestions in Kodori, including training local police 
to perform the police functions there.  The Abkhaz, he said, 
are ready to discuss establishing relations with the diaspora 
but he cautioned that the Abkhaz could not resume 
negotiations with Georgians until difficult issues were 
resolved.  Nonetheless, he said open lines of communication 
benefited both s
ides. 
 
9. (C) In response, Bryza focused on the goal of the meeting: 
to move beyond recriminations and re-start dialogue.  He said 
the U.S. speaks bilaterally to Georgia and as part of the FSG 
on the importance of avoiding provocative actions in 
Abkhazia, including on the patriot camp.  He said the U.S. 
also raises the Sigua case with Georgian officials.  Bryza 
suggested that the Abkhaz share their information on Sigua 
with the Georgians to try to get to the bottom of the case. 
He asked for clarification from the UN on the number of 
police in the Upper Kodori and the Security Zone.  He 
stressed the importance of implementing CBMs, not just 
talking about them.  On the question of appearing at the UN 
Security Council, Bryza said that such an appearance would be 
symbolic only, as the UNSC members with the exception of 
China, are all represented by the FSG.  He said the U.S. 
could support such a trip after there is something important 
to report, such as direct dialogue with Tbilisi at the 
highest level.  The other Friends supported Bryza's call for 
dialogue, underscored the importance of avoiding 
provocations, and pushed for progress on CBMs.  Softening, 
Shamba responded that the Abkhaz are ready to continue 
dialogue, including resuming the Quadripartite meetings and 
participating in a joint investigation of Sigua.  He said 
that the Abkhaz are ready to discuss CBMs, including the 
opening of maritime communications with UNOMIG and CIS PKF 
controlling the arrival of ships at the port of Sukhumi.  (He 
noted that ships from Georgia arrive regularly in Sukhumi, 
but that they are all, of course, illegal.) 
 
----------------------------------------- 
GETTING SIDES TO COMMIT TO SPECIFIC STEPS 
----------------------------------------- 
 
10. (C) During a consultative meeting among the FSG and the 
UN, Arnault reported that UNOMIG and the CIS PKF were 
currently undertaking joint verification of armed personnel 
in the Security Zone.  He agreed with Shamba that the 
Georgians likely have more than the 600 police allowed in the 
Security Zone, which encompasses the Gali and Zugdidi 
regions.  Arnault estimated the number to be around 1000. 
However, he said that Georgian law enforcement personnel in 
Upper Kodori numbered 283 police and 100 Svan border guards. 
Arnault agreed with the Abkhaz that the number of police 
should be rationalized but noted that the March 11 attack had 
&muddied the waters8 and made this more difficult.  The UN 
passed out a map of Abkhaz and UN sightings of unidentified 
personnel in Abkhaz-controlled areas, along with pictures of 
a group of seven unidentified personnel sighted by the UN in 
an Abkhaz-controlled area north of Upper Kodori.  Arnault 
later said it was impossible to know who these people were 
 
TBILISI 00001604  004 OF 006 
 
 
after Bryza pointed out that it was unfounded to assume they 
were Georgians (as was presupposed by some of the captions on 
the map).  Led by Guehenno, the FSG representatives agreed on 
the need to press for concrete mechanisms and commitments by 
the two sides.  They drafted a page of written questions for 
each side to respond to at their meetings later in the day. 
 
--------------------------------- 
GEORGIANS AGREE TO SPECIFIC STEPS 
--------------------------------- 
 
11. (C) In a follow-on meeting, the Georgian delegation went 
through the list provided to them point by point, starting 
with security issues and moving to CBMS: 
 
-------- 
SECURITY 
-------- 
 
-- On the question of the presence of reportedly Georgian 
personnel in the lower Kodori, Zguladze said categorically 
that there are no Georgian movements or deployments in lower 
Kodori.  She said she had just checked this information again 
today and that the official response from the Ministry is 
that Georgia is also worried about these elements which are 
in an area controlled by the Abkhaz and patrolled by the UN 
and CIS Peacekeeping Force.  She offered Georgian cooperation 
to help the UN identify these groups. 
 
-- On the number of personnel in the Security Zone, Zguladze 
said there are 600 personnel in the Security Zone and offered 
that the UN could verify this claim. 
 
-- On the reQeployment of the patriotic camp, Zguladze 
suggested that the FSG visit the cap and assess whether it is 
a security risk. 
 
-- On the appointment of a Coordinator for the Quadripartite 
meetings, Zguladze confirmed that a Coordinator had been 
appointed and is the Head of Division of the Department of 
Constitutional Security.  His name is Zurab Logua. 
 
-- On agreement to hold a Quadripartite meeting in July, 
Zguladze said the Georgian side is ready to participate. 
 
-- On rationalizing forces in Upper Kodori, Zguladze said 
that the Georgians had already reduced the presence in Upper 
Kodori from 800 to 270 and that although further decreases 
could be considered the threat assessment following the March 
11 attack indicates that this is the number needed to keep 
the population safe.  She said that about 35 percent of the 
police in Upper Kodori are locals. 
 
---- 
CBMS 
---- 
 
-- On allowing contacts between the Abkhaz and diaspora in 
Turkey, Antadze contended that this was not an issue raised 
in the last Geneva meeting and that there are contacts which 
are informal and ongoing. 
 
-- On opening maritime communications between Sukhumi and 
Trabzon, Turkey, Antadze said that Georgia supports this 
provided that there is a process developed with Georgia to 
resolve issues regarding customs procedures. 
 
-- On encouraging contacts between Georgians and Abkhaz, 
George Mangivadze said that there were no cases where the 
Georgian side prevented such contacts.  He said Georgia had 
no conditions on such contacts. 
 
-- On combating African Swine Fever, Antadze said that 
Georgia is already cooperating with the Abkhaz in this and 
other areas but it is not public at the request of the Abkhaz 
side.  All agreed for the UN to give each side a list of 
concrete steps it could take and ask for a response. 
 
To follow-up on these commitments, Antadze proposed that the 
UN convene monthly meetings with the sides and the FSG in 
Tbilisi and Sukhumi in order to monitor their implementation. 
 
------------------------------ 
ABKHAZ AGREE TO SPECIFIC STEPS 
------------------------------ 
 
12. (C) In a separate meeting with the Abkhaz, Shamba also 
responded to the UN paper (tailored for the Abkhaz) point by 
point: 
 
 
TBILISI 00001604  005 OF 006 
 
 
-------- 
DIALOGUE 
-------- 
 
-- On resuming Quadripartite meetings, he said the Abkhaz are 
ready to start the work in July. 
 
-- On allowing a JFFG investigation into Sigua, he said the 
Abkhaz are ready to participate and start immediately, 
perhaps even re-starting the Quadripartite meetings with the 
Sigua case. 
 
-- On participating in a meeting of the EC-funded Steering &
#x000A;Committee, Shamba said the Abkhaz are ready to participate in 
a meeting scheduled to take place in a few days. 
 
-- On a meeting at the leadership level, Shamba reiterated 
that a meeting without an outcome would have a negative 
impact and that the Abkhaz would be prepared to participate 
in a carefully prepared meeting which has the outcome of a 
signed document on the non-use of force or the lifting of CIS 
economic sanctions. 
 
---- 
CBMS 
---- 
 
-- On supporting contacts between Georgians and Abkhaz, 
Shamba said that the Abkhaz support contacts and pointed to a 
recently convened meeting on NATO in Istanbul by the Heinrich 
Boell Foundation.  He noted that this included some Abkhaz 
officials.  (Note:  When asked privately whether this might 
mean the Abkhaz would now support a joint trip to NATO with 
Abkhaz and Georgian officials, Shamba clarified that the 
Abkhaz could support contacts between non-officials but not 
between officials.  End note.) 
 
-- On cooperation on combating African Swine Fever, Shamba 
said the Georgians and Abkhaz already cooperative on both 
Avian Flu and African Swine Fever. 
 
-- On supporting the ICRC initiative on missing persons, 
Shamba said that the Abkhaz are ready to cooperate. 
 
13. (C) In a final consultative meeting of the FSG and the 
UN, all agreed that the German coordinator, who would be 
traveling to Georgia the week of July 2 would reinforce the 
points of the meeting to Tbilisi and Sukhumi.  The FSG also 
agreed that the UN may consider following-up with a 
high-level letter to the sides from New York urging progress 
on the agreed cooperative mechanisms.  Finally, the FSG 
agreed on a press statement to be released following a final 
meeting of the sides together to review the draft.  In 
response to a request by EU Special Representative for the 
South Caucasus Peter Semneby, conveyed by Germany, to include 
the EU in future Geneva meetings, the FSG decided the 
question bore further consideration by capitals, but that it 
did not rise to the level of a formal request.  Guehenno 
warned against changing an effective format.  Chernov noted 
that such a decision would require a decision at a very high 
level in Moscow.  Bujon-Barre said she had not discussed the 
issue with Semneby in Paris, as Semneby had apparently 
suggested to Lucas.  In a private sidebar, Fall approached 
the U.S. team with even more words of warning:  he said 
Semneby,s request was just one exploratory "tentacle" of an 
EU that wanted to supplant member states in such formats, 
noting that -- taken to its logical conclusion -- the EU 
would want to replace its member states at the UNSC.  He 
further warned that, contrary to the most predictable 
analysis, Russia might actually accept the EU as a member of 
the FSG, if only to use that development in the months that 
followed to weaken its effectiveness. 
 
------- 
COMMENT 
------- 
 
14. (C) More came out of this Geneva meeting than could have 
been expected, considering the heightened tensions in 
Abkhazia which are partly due to the fact that all Abkhaz 
eyes remain on Kosovo.  The resumption of the Quadripartite 
meetings is a significant and important step.  These meetings 
between law enforcement officials have not taken place since 
last October.  Although they will not stop potential 
incidents, they can diffuse them by creating a forum in which 
to discuss them.  The trick will be implementing the 
commitments made by each side.  We believe that Antadze's 
idea to hold monthly meetings to oversee implementation is a 
good one and it will help to keep the sides' feet to the 
fire.  End comment. 
 
TBILISI 00001604  006 OF 006 
 
 
 
15. (U) DAS Bryza cleared this message. 
TEFFT

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07TBILISI1601, CHECHEN REFUGEES RECEIVE TEMPORARY RESIDENCE

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
07TBILISI1601 2007-07-05 13:00 2011-08-30 01:44 UNCLASSIFIED Embassy Tbilisi

VZCZCXYZ0000
PP RUEHWEB

DE RUEHSI #1601 1861300
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 051300Z JUL 07
FM AMEMBASSY TBILISI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 6896
INFO RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW PRIORITY 8071
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY 4569

UNCLAS TBILISI 001601 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT. FOR EUR/CARC AND PRM 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PREL PHUM PREF GG
SUBJECT: CHECHEN REFUGEES RECEIVE TEMPORARY RESIDENCE 
PERMITS 
 
 
1.  Summary:  Georgian Minister of Refugees Giorgi 
Kheviasvhili marked World Refugee Day on June 20 by 
distributing temporary residence permits to 600 Chechen 
refugees living in Georgia's Pankisi Gorge.  The remainder of 
the estimated 1,300 refugees living in the Gorge will receive 
their permits within the next two months.  The new temporary 
residence permits replace older ID cards that simply 
indicated refugee status, and carry the weight of a full 
legal document.  The permits will be valid for three years 
and will enable refugees to purchase homes, open bank 
accounts, and move freely about the country.  In addition, 
the Ministry of Refugees (MRA) has drafted legislation that, 
if passed, will provide travel documents to all refugees, 
allowing them to travel to third countries.  End Summary. 
 
Permits first step toward integration? 
-------------------------------------- 
 
2.  United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) 
protection officer Edina Dziho told Poloff on June 29 that 
the distribution of temporary residence permits to the 
Chechen refugees living in Pankisi was an important step and 
will likely lead to an overall improvement in the refugees' 
quality of life.  She thought that the permits would be the 
first step toward local integration and full citizenship, but 
added that she was waiting to see what restrictions the MRA 
would place on the permits.  Unlike earlier refugee cards, 
she said, the new temporary residence permits are considered 
full legal documents, allowing refugees to perform everyday 
tasks, such as opening a bank account, that they were 
previously prevented from doing.  The permits also allow 
unhindered travel throughout Georgia, whereas in the past, 
refugees were limited to the Pankisi Gorge and Tbilisi. 
 
3.  In a separate meeting Irakli Kokaia, Director of the 
Department of Migration, Refugees, and Repatriation at the 
Ministry of Refugees, told Poloff that providing refugees 
with legal documents enabling them to open bank accounts was 
necessary to facilitate the distribution of state assistance. 
 On January 1, 2007, the Georgian government started 
providing 14 lari (USD 8.40) a month in assistance to all 
refugees, but apparently none of the refugees could collect 
their money because they could not open bank accounts - the 
funds were only available through a direct account transfer. 
Once a refugee opens an account, he said, the total accrued 
amount (from January onward) will be deposited into their 
account. 
 
Refugee travel documents by 2008 
-------------------------------- 
 
4.  Kokaia also said that the Ministry of Refugees has 
drafted legislation on the creation of travel documents for 
all refugees living in Georgia.  He said the existing 
Georgian law on refugees contradicts the 1951 UN Convention 
on Refugees, and was therefore rewritten.  The documents 
would adhere to guidelines established by the 1951 
Convention, which calls for Contracting (host) States to 
issue travel documents to refugees living in their territory 
for the purpose of traveling to a third country.  The 
Ministry hopes to present the law to Parliament by early 
Fall, he said, with a goal of issuing the first travel 
documents to refugees by early 2008. 
 
Comment 
------- 
 
5.  The Ministry's move to provide legal identity papers and 
travel documents is a long overdue step, bringing Georgian 
refugee law in compliance with the 1951 Convention (of which 
Georgia is a signatory) while providing refugees with the 
means to more fully integrate into Georgian society.  The 
residence permits will allow refugees to travel freely 
throughout Georgia, providing them access to employment 
opportunities outside the economically depressed Pankisi 
Gorge.  The presence of Chechen refugees in Pankisi has been 
a source of tension between Georgia and Russia in the past, 
with Russia accusing Georgia of harboring "terrorists" just 
across its border.  By permitting refugees to leave Pankisi, 
the Georgian government can reduce this point of contention 
between the two countries. 
TEFFT

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07TBILISI1595, MORE TIME NEEDED TO REOPEN GEORGIA-RUSSIA AIR LINKS

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
07TBILISI1595 2007-07-03 14:46 2011-08-30 01:44 UNCLASSIFIED Embassy Tbilisi

VZCZCXRO2553
RR RUEHAG RUEHAST RUEHDA RUEHDBU RUEHDF RUEHFL RUEHIK RUEHKW RUEHLA
RUEHLN RUEHLZ RUEHPOD RUEHROV RUEHSR RUEHVK RUEHYG
DE RUEHSI #1595 1841446
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 031446Z JUL 07
FM AMEMBASSY TBILISI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 6888
RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE
INFO RUCPDOC/DEPT OF COMMERCE WASHDC
RHMFIUU/FAA NATIONAL HQ WASHDC

UNCLAS TBILISI 001595 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR EUR/CARC AND EB/TRA/AN 
COMMERCE FOR DANICA STARKS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: EAIR PGOV PREL GG RU
SUBJECT: MORE TIME NEEDED TO REOPEN GEORGIA-RUSSIA AIR LINKS 
 
1. Georgian Airways announced on July 1 that it is about to start 
periodic charter flights to Moscow, beginning July 3.  The company's 
press release indicated that this is a temporary arrangement between 
the company and Russia's transport administration, facilitated by 
Georgia's Orthodox Church Patriarch.  Georgian Airways said that the 
charter flights do not imply a resumption of the scheduled air 
traffic with Georgia that was suspended by Russia on October 3, 2006 
after the arrest of Russian military spies in Tbilisi. 
 
2. The press characterized the move as evidence of melting ice 
between Russia and Georgia.  Since October last year Georgian 
travelers have been using Kiev or Yerevan as stopovers for accessing 
Russia, thus paying higher airfare than before.  Unfortunately, on 
June 2 Georgian Airways announced that the Russian side has not yet 
sent a note to the Georgian United Transport Administration (UTA) to 
confirm that a flight permit has been issued to the Georgian air 
carrier.  In a conversation with us, the head of the UTA, Irakli 
Taktakishvili, could not hide his irritation about Georgian Airways' 
premature statement trumpeting its success before receiving the 
necessary confirmations. 
 
3. Georgian Airways itself is puzzled by the delay, as concrete 
reasons are not known to them either.  Vice-president of the 
company, Roland Beridze confirmed that preliminary agreement on 
charter flights was achieved with Russia's transport authorities and 
the date was agreed.  Beridze suspects the delay might be caused by 
Russia's desire that the Georgians permit similar flights for 
Russia's Aeroflot as well.  He assured us that Georgian Airways 
would not have any objection to Aeroflot flights. 
 
TEFFT

Wikileaks

07TBILISI1574, Georgia Bi-Weekly Update June 29

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
07TBILISI1574 2007-07-02 15:24 2011-08-30 01:44 UNCLASSIFIED Embassy Tbilisi

VZCZCXRO1246
RR RUEHAG RUEHAST RUEHDA RUEHDBU RUEHDF RUEHFL RUEHIK RUEHKW RUEHLA
RUEHLN RUEHLZ RUEHPOD RUEHROV RUEHSR RUEHVK RUEHYG
DE RUEHSI #1574/01 1831524
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 021524Z JUL 07
FM AMEMBASSY TBILISI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 6872
INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 TBILISI 001574 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PREL PGOV PHUM GG
SUBJECT: Georgia Bi-Weekly Update June 29 
 
1. This cable contains current items of political, 
economic, and social interest concerning Georgia during the 
weeks of June 16-29. 
 
Criminal Procedure Code Moving through Parliament 
--------------------------------------------- ---- 
2. The Legal Committee of Georgian Parliament is currently 
introducing non-controversial portions of the new draft 
Criminal Procedure Code (CPC) in full committee in 
preparation for the codeQs second reading in Parliament, 
likely to happen this fall.  Parliament passed the CPC in 
first reading in December 2006, and referred it to the 
Legal Committee, which held a series of ad hoc Committee 
meetings with interested Members of Parliament, Government 
officials, and NGOs.  Based on these meetings, the ad hoc 
Committee members met in Batumi, Georgia in early May to 
hammer out necessary implementation changes.  After this 
meeting, the ad hoc Committee has held several additional 
meetings to craft changes to the CPC implementing these 
changes.  We anticipate that the Legal Committee will 
complete its work on the CPC this summer and introduce the 
completed CPC for its second reading in September and its 
final reading later in the fall.  The new CPC is considered 
a key reform in developing a judicial system governed by 
the rule of law. 
 
Saakashvili on Cooperation, Conflicts at BSEC Summit 
--------------------------------------------- ------- 
3. Leaders from twelve Black Sea states assembled in 
Istanbul for the fifteenth anniversary of Black Sea 
Economic Cooperation (BSEC) on June 25.   Economic 
cooperation, energy diversification and trade issues topped 
the agenda, with discussion of concrete projects to 
construct a Trans-Caspian gas pipeline and a 7,500- 
kilometer ring road along the Black Sea coast.  Addressing 
the summit, President Saakashvili focused on the importance 
of international economic cooperation and energy security, 
as well as on GeorgiaQs efforts at peaceful resolution of 
the separatist conflicts, saying QGeorgia will spare no 
effort to ensure that all ethnic groups, Abkhaz and 
Ossetians, as well as every citizen of Georgia, enjoy well- 
being and prosperity.Q 
 
Speculation on a Georgian-Russian Deal in South Ossetia 
--------------------------------------------- ---------- 
4. As the BSEC summit was proceeding in Istanbul, the 
Russian newspaper Kommersant published an article Q- much 
commented on in Georgia -- claiming that Tbilisi and Moscow 
had struck a deal.  Under its conditions, Georgia would 
support RussiaQs accession to the WTO, if Russia cut off 
its relations with South Ossetian separatist leader Eduard 
Kokoity and supported the Georgian-backed administration of 
Dmitry Sanakoyev instead.  In addition, Georgia would agree 
to the indefinite presence of Russian peacekeepers in the 
conflict zone.  Both Foreign Ministers, Sergey Lavrov of 
Russia and Gela Bezhuashvili of Georgia, refuted these 
claims.  Bezhuashvili for his part stressed that Qneither 
Georgia nor Russia base their policy on journalistsQ 
opinions.Q   He said that Georgia was ready to make 
compromises, but any concessions it made would not affect 
the country's strategic interests. 
 
NGO Calls for New Anti-Torture Strategy 
--------------------------------------- 
5. On June 26, UN International Day in Support of Victims 
of Torture, the NGO RCT/Empathy unveiled its annual report 
on victims of torture and inhumane treatment in Georgia, 
and urged Georgia to take the necessary steps to join the 
Optional Protocol to the UN Convention Against Torture 
(OPCAT).  Georgia ratified the OPCAT in July 2005, but has 
yet to craft a Georgian anti-torture action plan (to 
replace the one of 2003-2005).  On June 20, the Georgian 
government created an Interagency Anti-Torture Council to 
address torture and inhumane treatment, but details of the 
councilQs operation have not yet been announced.  Embassy 
is following up on this issue.  RCT/EmpathyQs goal is for 
Georgia to establish a National Preventative Mechanism that 
would permit unannounced visits to all places of detention, 
something Georgia committed to in signing the OPCAT. 
 
MONEYVAL Welcomes Georgian Anti-Money Laundering Measures 
--------------------------------------------- ------------ 
6. The Council of EuropeQs (COE) Committee of Experts on 
the Evaluation of Anti-Money Laundering Measures (MONEYVAL) 
has published a new report on Georgia, citing major changes 
since the previous evaluation in May 2003.  The report says 
that the basic building blocks of a system to combat money 
laundering and terrorist finance are broadly in place, 
citing in particular the adoption of the law QOn 
Facilitating the Prevention of Illicit Income LegalizationQ 
and the creation of the Financial Monitoring Service. 
Georgian prosecutors have secured convictions in money 
laundering cases.  Despite the progress, the report 
 
TBILISI 00001574  002 OF 002 
 
 
indicates that Georgia still has work to do.  Among the 
needs is an effective system to detect the physical cros
s- 
border transportation of currency and bearer-negotiable 
instruments. 
 
Iran to Invest in Georgia? 
-------------------------- 
7. On June 20 Georgian Foreign Minister Gela Bezhuashvili 
met with Iranian Deputy Foreign Minister Manuchehr 
Mohammadi, who was visiting Tbilisi for a Georgian-Iranian 
roundtable hosted by a think tank.  The two ministers 
reportedly discussed a wide range of bilateral issues, with 
special emphasis on cooperation in the fields of culture, 
science and education.  Georgian media picked up a story, 
appearing several days after the visit in Russian newspaper 
QNezavisimaya Gazeta,Q that Iran plans to invest USD 1 
billion in Georgian economy.  The Iranian agency Irna 
reported that GeorgiaQs Ambassador to Iran, Levan Asatiani, 
confirmed IranQs intention. 
 
American Investment to Reconstruct a Tbilisi Landmark 
--------------------------------------------- -------- 
8. Speaking at the public presentation of the Mtatsminda 
Plateau project, sponsored by the American-Georgian joint 
venture GMT Group on June 26, Ambassador Tefft said 
QGrowing investment is the direct result of GeorgiaQs 
efforts after the Rose Revolution to reduce obstacles to 
doing business.Q  The project calls for reconstruction of a 
landmark of Tbilisi, the Funicular Restaurant overlooking 
the city, which was built in the 1930s and damaged during 
the civil unrest in 1991.   GMT GroupQs partners and the 
Overseas Private investment Corporation (OPIC) will 
allocate USD 15 million for the reconstruction project. 
OPICQs loan agreement for about USD 8 million is scheduled 
for signing on September 11 at the American Georgia 
Business CouncilQs annual meeting in Tbilisi. 
 
More Kazakh Investment to Georgia 
--------------------------------- 
9. On June 13, a group of 16 Kazakh private businesses, 
including the Chairman of the Board of Directors of the 
Georgian-Kazakh venture AKSAI BMC, arrived in Georgia for 
three days of meetings and site visits in Tbilisi and 
Batumi.  Prior to the visit, AKSAI BMC obtained a 25-year 
license for oil and gas exploration and production works in 
western Georgia, and plans to invest USD 25-30 million in 
the initial stage of the exploration.  In addition to oil 
and gas, the company is interested in tourism 
infrastructure and real estate investment projects in 
Georgia.  AKSAI BMC, founded in 1992, has been involved in 
oil and gas projects in western Kazakhstan.  Since 2005, 
Kazakh investors, including the state-owned enterprises and 
banks, have made significant investments in GeorgiaQs 
telecommunications, oil and gas infrastructure, tourism, 
and real estate development projects, including United 
Georgian Telecom, Tbilgazi, Batumi Oil Terminal, several 
hotels in Adjara, and Likani resort. 
TEFFT

Wikileaks